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Contract law does not adequately account for the harms that we can inflict
on third parties by joint agreement. Some terms are prohibited, and some third
party interests are protected by independent causes ofaction. But a wide variety
of material interests that are otherwise recognized in law may be burdened by
other people's contracts. This Article proposes that ambiguous contract terms
be construed to avoid harming third parties.
In some contexts, courts already protect third parties in this way. The
doctrinal rule that courts should construe ambiguous terms "reasonably "
accommodates this practice but does not invite it. Prevailing contract theory is
affirmatively hostile to it. This Article locates the role of contract law in
mitigating negative externalities within a broader institutional division of labor.
Identifying the function of contract law helps justify an explicit interpretive
principle that disfavors terms injurious to third parties.
Introduction.................................................... 212
I. Third Parties In Existing Literature .......................... 217
II. Public and Private Law, or How We Limit Harm to Others ...................... 221
A. Epiphenomenal, Essential, Ideological........................ 221
B. The State Mandate to Prevent Harm, and the Broad Concept of
a Legal Interest ..................................... 225
C. Concentrated and Diffuse Externalities .......... .......... 229
D. The Basic Division of Labor .................... ........ 229
III. Minimizing Concentrated Externalities in Private Law............................ 236
IV. Concentrated Externalities from Merger Agreements ............. 246
A. Creditors .......................................... 248
B. Employees ................................................ 250
C. Shareholders .................................. ..... 252
D. Consumers ................................ ........ 254
Conclusion ........................................... 255
211
Yale Journal on Regulation
Introduction
If you and I make a deal that is intended to benefit another person, she has
a right to enforce her interests under our agreement as a third party beneficiary.'
If you and I make a deal that harms another person, that deal may be
unenforceable - but not usually. Many contracts adversely affect others; few are
prohibited. On its face, contract law appears unresponsive to some of the harm
contracting parties can do to others by mutual agreement.
Our ability to harm others through contract is defensible, at least in part. In
complex societies, much of what we do harms others. If we were never permitted
to burden others in the pursuit of our interests, our range of free action would be
severely constricted. Our entitlements have to mutually adjust. But the process
of mutual adjustment that private law contemplates is inadequate when joint
action negatively affects third parties. We rely too much on the blunt instrument
of outlawing terms without attending to the effects of enforceable agreements.
This Article proposes an interpretive rule that would better protect third
party losers in contract: Textual ambiguity should be resolved to avoid
compromising the legally-recognized interests of third parties. Courts already do
this in some contexts, as in the interpretation of merger agreements, as a result
of preferring the most reasonable meaning of ambiguous terms.2 This Article
defends an interpretative rule that expressly considers third party interests, shows
how the rule works, and argues for its more consistent application. It defends
these theses by reference to the big picture, situating contract law within the
broader set of legal rules designed to limit third party harm. The Article argues
that, while public law regulates diffuse externalities, private law attends to
concentrated externalities. The third party interests at issue in contract are among
the concentrated externalities that contract law should mitigate. The proposed
interpretive rule is an appropriate tool for that purpose.
One recent controversial case might have benefited from this rule: the suit
by holdouts from Argentina's 2005 and 2010 debt restructuring, NML Capital,
Ltd. v. Republic ofArgentina.3 Argentina defaulted on its debt in 2001, and most
creditors eventually accepted new notes worth substantially less than their
original notes.4 Holdout creditors refused to participate in either of the two debt
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1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1979) ("A promise in a contract
creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended
beneficiary may enforce the duty.").
2. See infra Part III.
3. 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).
4. Peter Eavis, Argentine Debt Dispute Remains Murky Even as London Court Sheds





exchanges. Argentina proceeded to make payments on the new notes but not on
the old notes.6 The holdouts then sued under a "Pari Passu Clause" that requires
their claims be treated equally to those of other unsecured noteholders.7 As the
Second Circuit observed, citing voluminous scholarly commentary, Pari Passu
Clauses are ambiguous.8 The district court in NML Capital read the clause to
prevent Argentina from making payments on the new debt without making
payments on the original debt. The Second Circuit upheld the district court's
decision to enjoin payment on the new notes, concluding that the contract
"manifested an intention to protect bondholders from more than just formal
subordination."9 The court read terms of the bond as if each bond were an
agreement between that individual bondholder and the government of Argentina,
notwithstanding the fact that numerous other bondholders had held identical
contracts and now held other notes based on their rights under the initial bonds.
Nowhere did the appellate court expressly consider the interests of the vast
majority of creditors who had accepted cents on the dollars and now stood to lose
more, let alone the broader swath of the public that had an interest in avoiding
another default by Argentina.'0 Since Argentina could not and cannot pay all
creditors in full, it indeed defaulted a second time and has been shut out of
international debt markets ever since."
Third parties are implicated across the full range of contracts. I discuss the
case of merger agreements at length below.'2 In another common example, courts
should (as some courts already do) read noncompete provisions in employment
contracts as narrowly as possible since those provisions undermine not only
diffuse consumer interests but also the more concentrated interests of rival
firms. 13
Other examples together demonstrate the breadth of application. Courts
already protect the interests of third parties in land transactions by preferring
clear allocation of property rights and disfavoring uncertainty about ownership
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See 699 F.3d 246.
8. Id. at 258.
9. Id. at 258-59.
10. Today, sovereign debt contracts have a "collective action clause" that allows a
super-majority of creditors to amend terms and bind dissenting bondholders. 699 F.3d at 253. In other
words, issuers and creditors have found a way to get around the presumptively bilateral character of the
bond agreement.
11. See Eavis, supra note 4.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See, e.g., Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Babcock, Nos. 08-290, 08-185, 2011 WL
121891, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2011) ("Louisiana restricts, and narrowly construes, non-competition
agreements and similar types of restrictive covenants."); Goodman Mfg. Co. v. Raytheon Co., No. 98 Civ.
2774 (LAP), 1999 WL 681382, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999) ("New York courts narrowly construe
non-compete provisions."); Mgmt. Recruiters of Boulder, Inc. v. Miller, 762 P.2d 763, 766 (Colo. App.
Ct. 1988) (narrowly construing a non-compete agreement).
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over time; that rule benefits future buyers as well as creditors.'4 We should also
expect courts reading construction contracts for residential developments to
discourage practices and materials that produce latent defects-defects that will
ultimately harm the people who live there. Courts should read supply agreements
between manufacturers and retailers in ways that are compatible with the
statutory employment rights of a supplier's employees (for example, in terms of
chemical exposure and delivery times). They should read subleases as consistent
with a sublessor's obligations to her landlord, and co-op purchase agreements as
compatible with the co-op member's obligations to the cooperative, at least
where the subtenant and buyer are on notice of those constraints. Courts hould
construe patent licenses to preserve the value of other licenses granted by the
patent-holder, where each licensee is on notice of other licenses, in the way that
bankruptcy courts are sensitive to the effects of secured credit agreements on
other creditors.15 Courts should interpret agreements with auditors and insurance
companies to favor reporting and coverage adequate to protect the interests of
end-users or future claimants. Courts should narrowly construe confidentiality
provisions in settlement agreements where the information is relevant to the
claims of future plaintiffs.
Further examples abound in the context of collective bargaining. The ban
on secondary boycotts demonstrates a public policy protective of 'bystander
firms' down the supply chain from firms involved in labor disputes.'6 Collective
bargaining agreements could be read to avoid accommodating labor action that
involves the disputes of other employers. Given that current law allows for the
permanent replacement of employees, collective bargaining settlements could be
read to disfavor terms that disadvantage replacement employees, even where an
alternative reading would not amount to an actionable unfair labor practice by
the union.'7 Civil rights statutes create legal interests in employees that may be
14. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization i the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26-34 (2000) (arguing that fixed menu of
property types, as opposed to infinitely varied rights determined by contract, reduces costs for third parties
who are better able to ascertain status of entitlements).
15. For the claim that secured creditors generate negative externalities for other
creditors, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority ofSecured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1997); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority ofSecured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1279 (1996); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and
Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349
(1997). For a defense of priority for secured creditors, see Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach
to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998); Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396 (1997).The claim that secured creditors generate externalities for
other creditors is most persuasive with respect o nonadjusting creditors. Although licensees negotiate he
terms of their contract, the costs of drafting contracts that protect against later licenses that may undermine
value in surprising ways is itself an externality.
16. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)
(2012). My point here is not an endorsement of this rule in labor law but an elaboration of what should
follow from it, under contract law.
17. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 904 (1938) (permitting permanent




constricted by arbitration terms in collective bargaining agreements. We already
see that courts will avoid reading a collective bargaining agreement to forfeit
judicial redress for discrimination except where the language waiving legal
redress is express and unavoidable.'8
Although courts sometimes engage in the angled interpretation proposed
here, they do so inconsistently and rarely invoke an explicit rule. That is because
third party losers now fall between various cracks in contract theory.'9 An
interpretative rule that protects their interests has not been adequately articulated
or defended.
This might be surprising, since much of law is devoted to limiting the harms
we impose on others. This is true of private and public law. This shared purpose
has led some to question whether there is any meaningful distinction between
public and private law, or whether the boundary instead reflects a foundational
error by which we mistakenly inoculated some categories of conduct from public
scrutiny.20 The general principle that most laws protect us from injury by others
has obscured important differences in the kinds of harms that motivate public
and private law.
The ultimate aim of this Article is to defend a role for contract interpretation
in attenuating negative externalities, but I will make that claim by way of a more
general one about the division of labor between public and private law and what
it tells us about the role of the common law of contracts. Public law tends to use
ex ante, untailored rules, especially blanket prohibitions and fixed prices, to
regulate diffuse harms to people whose identities are not knowable in advance.
Private law relies on more flexible standards that operate ex post and allow
textured balancing of a limited set of interests-where limited does not mean
only two.21
We generally think of contracts, torts and property (and related areas like
corporations or bankruptcy) as private law subjects but the laws regulating
private exchange, tort-like conduct, and property entitlements actually span both
public and private law. For example, the laws of employment discrimination22
and securities regulation23 include some general rules subject to public
18. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (holding that
collective bargaining agreements must clearly and unavoidably waive right to litigate discrimination
claim).
19. These are elaborated in Part I, supra.
20. The rise of skepticism about the public/private distinction is described in Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New
Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 884-87 (1991); John Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law, 125
HARV. L. REv. 1640 (2012); and Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of
Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998).
23. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATIONS: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES
§§ 9.02-.03 (2005) (identifying SEC rules for which there are implied private rights of action, and others
for which there are not).
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enforcement alongside private rights of action and related common law tort
claims like breach of contract or fraud. Consumer2 4 and employment25 regulation
require certain terms and prohibit others in consumer and employment
agreements while general contract law governs enforceable agreements.
Environmental regulations prohibit certain conduct and require other conduct by
manufacturing firms, but tort and property regimes still based largely on common
law dictate civil liability to individuals distinctly harmed by their production
methods.26 We cannot delineate the boundaries between public and private law
by reference to the kinds of rights or conduct the law regulates. Both public and
private law are enlisted to regulate conduct that affects others. We can
meaningfully distinguish only between the methods deployed by public and
private law.
Matching method to purpose, common law contract-that is, the private
law part of contract regulation-is appropriately used to attenuate harms to third
parties' legally protected interests. Although the rules of property and tort are
more obviously enlisted to manage such externalities, contract law is also well-
suited for limiting certain kinds of concentrated externalities, namely, those that
arise from cooperative conduct between two parties. Scholars generally believe
that only the boundaries of contract law reflect third party interests27_
boundaries largely set by public law regulation of particular classes of contract,
such as consumer or employment agreements. But the rules by which contractual
obligations are determined within the domain of contract also can and do take
third parties into account. Where third party interests are reflected in background
legal norms, courts interpret ambiguous agreements in ways that minimize harm
24. See Joseph Singer, The Rule ofReason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1369, 1423 (2013) ("In addition to basic democratic norms, both statutes and common law evolved in the
twentieth century to adopt a core principle of consumer protection."); see also Paul Diller, Combating
Obesity with a Right to Nutrition, 101 GEO. L.J. 969, 1005-07 (2013) (discussing interplay of statutory
and common law consumer claims against fast food industry).
25. See Marion Crain & Pauline Kim, A Holistic Approach to Teaching Work Law, 58
ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 7 (2013) ("Employment Law covers the statutes and common law governing
individual rights at work, ranging from minimum standards legislation to judicially created doctrines
based in tort and contract law."); see also Rachel S. Amow-Richman, Employment as Transaction, 39
SETON HALL L. REv. 447, 466 (2009).
26. See Peter Cane, Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regulations?, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 427 (2002); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulation and Litigation: Complementary Tools for
Environmental Protection, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 371 (2005); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law
in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2007) (discussing common-law torts as part of
environmental law).
27. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Something Old, Something New: Governing the
Workplace by Contract Again, 28 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 351, 364 (2007) ("Public law sets boundaries
on private ordering, for example, through 'public policy' limits on enforceability of contracts."); Eric
Liddick, Give Me Freedom ofContract or Give Me Death: The Obscurity ofArticle 44(a) ofthe Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, 54 LoY. L. REv. 602, 604 (2008) ("The Supreme Court's early formulation of
this freedom's boundaries remains equally germane to present day commercial transactions: parties may





to those third parties.28 This practice may be at odds with our formal theories of
contract interpretation but it is consistent with the regulatory method of common
law contract.29
Part I situates the argument here against existing contract theory. Part II
considers existing perspectives onpublic and private law and offers an improved
account of their division of labor. Part II locates contract law within the broader
"strategy" by which private law manages concentrated externalities. I propose
that contract law can fulfill this function most effectively if we recognize an
interpretive principle that allows courts to construe ambiguous terms in ways that
protect third party losers. Part III studies the case of merger agreements and
shows how courts already interpret those agreements to minimize concentrated
externalities. I recommend that they do so consistently across the full range of
contracts.
I. Third Parties In Existing Literature
Who are the third parties to contracts? Third parties are implicated by other
people's contracts in a variety of ways. Almost every commercial contract is
situated in a market in which other participants are third parties; the prices those
parties pay in their own transactions will be affected by the terms of any one
contract by others through the price mechanism of supply and demand. Third
parties affected by a contract may also include others in a contractual relationship
with one of the parties, such as suppliers or downstream buyers. Other relevant
third parties may be those with a material interest in how a physical resource at
issue in a contract is used, such as neighbors to a property being bought and sold
by others. Third parties who willingly or inadvertently insure one of the parties
to a contract, as the case of taxpayers in some industries, are also affected by its
terms.
Of course, not all of these third parties are equally affected by the contracts
of others. In some cases, the marginal effect of any single third party transaction
is small; but in some of these cases, the cumulative effect is nevertheless
substantial.30 More importantly, there are numerous third party interests that are
not legally protected. Famously, where a rival enters an advantageous contract
with suppliers or consumers, business competitors may be adversely affected in
economic terms, but without legal injury. In economic terms, externalities, or
effects on third parties, include the full range of effects irrespective of legal
significance. This Article is interested only in the effect of contracts on the
28. See infra Parts II (describing the rule) & III (describing the rule's application to
merger agreements).
29. See infra Part II.
30. For example, Margaret Jane Radin has observed that copyright waivers by
individuals en masse has the effect of undermining a publicly enacted scheme of user rights. See
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
168-70 (2013).
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legally-protected interests of third parties.3 1 It does not set out to offer an account
of why any kind of material interest should be protected. Instead, it offers an
account of how we should protect those interests our legal institutions have
already recognized.
One might doubt whether contract terms adversely affecting legally-
recognized third party interests are enforceable in the first place. To the extent
that a term is simply prohibited, there is no need to incorporate third party
interests into interpretation, an exercise that arises only with respect to
ambiguous terms in enforceable agreements. But law is limited as a tool, and two
of its limitations are the legislative costs of designing well-tailored rules3 2 and
the error costs of judicial decision-making.3 3 The legislature undertakes to ban
many classes of contracts with negative externalities, but defining these
transaction categories in a way that is neither under- nor over-inclusive is so
costly as to be unlikely. Judges are empowered to make these calls on a contract
by contract basis through the doctrine prohibiting contracts "against public
policy." A loose construction of public policy, however, would make
adjudication unpredictable and inconsistent. Instead, judges generally prohibit
only classes of contract generally recognized as prohibited or at least as
problematic in some way.3 4 Their judicial restraint is well-advised, but together
with legislative restraint, results in the enforceability of agreements that may
adversely affect third parties.
If the law cannot fully protect them, might not adversely affected third
parties themselves contract to protect their own interests? Of course, in some
cases they do.35 Even in these cases, we might have reason to be concerned about
the distributional effect of their self-protection. But transaction costs also make
it unlikely that they will self-protect. First, third parties to any single transaction
are third parties to a near-infinite number of transactions. In many cases, the
identities of those whose agreements may have an adverse effect are unknown.
Like victims of potential negligent drivers, they cannot undertake to contract
with all those who might do them harm. In those cases where a prospective third
party has information adequate to propose protective terms to a would-be
contractor, their relationship is likely to be unique; the absence of market norms
or equilibrium prices increases the probability of bargaining failure. The upshot
31. See infra Part II.B for more discussion of the idea of a legally-protected interest.
32. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine
and the Judicial Manipulation ofLegislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 12 (2008) (describing the
costs of legislative enactment).
33. See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93
VA. L. REv. 1437, 1453-60 (2007) (discussing varieties ofjudicial error).
34. See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV.
433, 452 (1993) ("[Plublic policy defenses are limited to instances when 'existing laws and legal
precedents .. demonstrate .. .a well defined and dominant policy' against contract enforcement.") (citing
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 44 (1987)).
35. For example, secured creditors contract to limit the ways in which future borrowing




is that contracts adversely affecting third parties are not and cannot feasibly be
banned completely; those third parties cannot always themselves contract to
protect their material interests from joint action by others, and even when they
can they will have to pay for it, which undermines the value of an existing legal
entitlement. The internal rules of contract law, which govern enforceable
agreements, are our best bet for mitigating negative externalities from contract.
For different reasons, scholars from both philosophical and economic
perspectives are drawn to an insular picture of contract interpretation focused
exclusively on the parties to contract. The result is that, although everyone would
acknowledge the legitimate interests of third parties, courts do not assign any
formal and systematic role to those interests in the exercise of interpretation.
Philosophers of contract tend to take the dyadic (two-party) nature of
private litigation, and of contracts in particular, to imply that only the rights and
duties of litigants toward each other are relevant to resolving their dispute.36
Public law is supposed to handle justice writ large. Contract law is private law,
and contract interpretation is limited to deciphering party intent. Contracting
parties clearly lack authority to undermine the legal interests of others but those
committed to the special moral logic of contract seem to assume that legal rules
outside contract protect those interests, either by giving third parties a cause of
action against one of the contracting parties or by rendering contracts that run
afoul of third party interests unenforceable. As discussed further below,
however, not all legal interests burdened by the contracts of others are associated
with an independent cause of action or specific restrictions on contracting
power.38
For their part, legal economists are focused on externalities, or the costs that
people impose on others. In principle, when the burden to others associated with
my use of my property exceeds my gain, those harmed will pay me something to
stop-something more than my use is worth to me but less than avoiding my use
is worth to them. But economists anticipate that people may not negotiate the
most efficient use of their entitlements where the costs of bargaining are high
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See, e.g., Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1673, 1727 (2007) (asserting that what a contract has transferred is "decided by the parties' intentions
and interests as manifested in their mutual assents, reasonably interpreted, at contract formation"); Brian
Langille & Arthur Ripstein, "Strictly Speaking - It Went without Saying", 2 LEGAL THEORY 63 (1996)
(arguing that contract gaps can be filled contextually without deviating from party intent); Seana Shiffrin,
Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 VA. L. REV. 159 (2012) (discussing the best
interpretation of performance obligation based on what promisors most likely had in mind).
38. See infra Part II.B.
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and, for this reason, legal rules are necessary to limit harms to others.39 The outer
bounds of contract are set to protect third parties.40
But economists tend to regard contract law itself, including the rules of
interpretation, as the law that governs only those bargains that were successfully
made. Shortfalls in contract design are taken to reflect a rational trade-off
between the costs of drafting a more complete contract and the risks that attend
contractual gaps.4 1 Although the rules that govern contract should be forward-
looking from an economic perspective, and take into account the effects on the
contracting behavior of future parties, those rules do not usually reference the
interests of third parties as they are affected by the contract at hand.
Notwithstanding the breadth of interests incorporated into economic reasoning
behind legal rules, legal economists take the rules themselves to direct judges to
consider only the contractual intentions of those party to an agreement.42
As a result of the role that each school assigns to contract law within the
broader scheme of legal institutions, neither philosophers nor economists writing
about contract have adequately accounted for third party interests in contract
interpretation. The third party whose legally protected interests are injured
through contract was not party to the successful bargain that a contract might
otherwise represent. And given the costs of legislative process, her legal interest
in a transaction may be too unique to justify invoking the machinery of public
law on her behalf. Her injury is a private wrong even where it does give rise to
an independent right of action against the contracting parties.43 The prevailing
map of contract's location within law is not fine-grained enough to account for
her.
A better rendition of contract alongside other legal institutions suggests its
proper role in protecting the legal interests of third parties within its domain. The
simple interpretive norm recommended here flows naturally from the private law
character of common law contract, properly understood: Private law limits
concentrated externalities. Public law regulates diffuse externalities. This
division of labor is elaborated in the next Part.
39. This is at least a way to characterize the insight that, where entitlements conflict
and bargaining failure is high, "efficiency is promoted by assigning the legal right to the party who would
buy" the entitlement in the absence of transaction costs. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW 52 (1972). My characterization implies that a person harms another when the former uses her
entitlement at the expense of the latter's even though the former attaches less value to her use. That is, if
I disrupt your sleep in order to sing noisily, I harm you. But if I disrupt your sleep in order to put out a fire
noisily, I do not harm you.
40. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58-61
(1993) (suggesting that negative externalities delineate limits to free contract).
41. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The
Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis,
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006).
42. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE
L.J. 926 (2010) (advocating a formalist approach to interpretation).




II. Public and Private Law, or How We Limit Harm to Others
What is the distinction between public and private law? We lack a
satisfactory account. Although legal scholars invoke these categories often,
existing methods by which we carve up law either do not correspond to our usage
of the public/private distinction, or they invest too little or too much in it. Still
others regard the very distinction with suspicion.
This Part will discuss existing perspectives on the boundary between public
and private law and then offer an alternative account that focuses on the scope of
harm. The affirmative account begins in Section B with an overview of how we
regulate externalities, highlighting the expansive concept of a legal interest.
Section C introduces a distinction between concentrated and diffuse externalities.
Section D proposes that public law is better suited for regulating diffuse
externalities and is ill-suited to handle concentrated externalities; the latter task
is usually and appropriately relegated to private law.
A. Epiphenomenal, Essential, Ideological
Economists have not systematically theorized the boundary between public
and private law but they have offered a related analytic boundary between
criminal and civil law.4 Robert Cooter suggests that criminal law deters
absolutely by subjecting criminal activity to a price that no one is expected to
willingly pay.45 Civil law prices conduct in order to force actors to internalize
the costs of their own activity.46 Thomas Ulen elaborates on this framework and
observes that, among other differences, criminal wrongs "inflict costs on society
beyond those imposed on any particular victims," i.e., victims are "diffuse."4 7 In
this last respect, the suggested economic boundary between criminal and civil
law appears to resemble the one proposed in this Article between public and
private law.
But the distinction between civil and criminal law does not map onto the
private/public one. Statutory and administrative regulations of private activity
often impose civil remedies or penalties but still qualify as public law. And even
the civil/criminal distinction plays an inconsistent role in regulatory analyses,
perhaps because so many regulatory schemes incorporate both civil and criminal
elements without apparent regard for a clear division of labor; indeed, some
scholars have decried this very tendency.4 8
44. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1538-51 (1984)
(surveying price and sanction functions of tort, contract, criminal law, and regulation); Thomas Ulen, The
Economics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 351 (1996).
45. Cooter, supra note 44, at 1549.
46. Id. at 1528.
47. Ulen, supra note 44, at 352.
48. See John Coffee, Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models - And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992) (disfavoring the "encroachment"
of criminal law into fields that used to be regarded as civil).
221
Yale Journal on Regulation
Legal economists have not devoted much time to the categories of public
and private law as such, and this may reflect the importance they attach to that
distinction. In their view, the difference lies mostly in the method by which
public policy is promoted; but the aims are basically the same, and the choice of
method highly contingent.49
The economic view of private law is at odds with some important features
of private law. The two parties in a private law claim control almost everything
about how that claim proceeds and its probability of success, starting with
whether the claim is brought; they seem, and perceive themselves, to be more
than simple agents of public policy. Moreover, legal reasoning is essential to the
practice of law, and the reasons judges give for the resolution of tort, contract
and property cases have to do with rights and duties that private individuals owe
one another. Legal economic explanations of law do not seem to map onto either
the internal structure or the language of law.50 Legal economists regard the
universe of considerations as open at all times-that is, welfare analysis neither
prioritizes the interests of any set of persons in a given decision-moment, nor
elevates any kind of interest over others. Legal economists distinguish between
preferences held more or less intensely, or by many or fewer persons; but the
source of utility is not relevant to their analyses. They do not have principled
reasons for affording priority to certain interests in the context of a given
procedure or decision, as for example, the interests of litigants in the settlement
of their own dispute. To be sure, legal economics allows that the legal means
appropriate to regulatory ends may vary. But it does not attach normative
significance to regulatory method.
The result is that, however illuminating in other respects, legal economics
is foundationally ill-suited to explain the distinction between public and private
law; it does not take the difference seriously. Its broad outlook presumes the
distinction is highly contingent. It treats the bilateral structure of private law, for
example, as a peculiarity to be explained rather than as a fundamental feature of
our legal system.51 Legal economists do distinguish pragmatically between
49. For a legal economic discussion of private law's structure, as distinct from other
regulation, see STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 262-76 (1987). See also
William Lucy, Method and Fit: Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of Tort Law, 52 MCGILL
L.J. 605, 613 (2007) (describing criticisms of legal economic accounts of private law as excessively
contingent or ad hoc); Nate Oman, The Honor ofPrivate Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 35 (2011) (stating
that law and economics "is hostile to divisions between private and public law, preferring to see the whole
of the corpus juris through the lens of economic efficiency").
50. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 14-24, 122-23, 132-34 (2004) (stating
that economic explanations of contract law are at odds with the internal point of view and the reasoning
of case law); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 13-24 (2001); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL
THEORY 457, 460-63 (2000) (arguing that economic analysis fails to account for bilateral structure of
private law). But see Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 298-99 (2007) (arguing
that economic analysis is consistent with the internal point of view).
51. See Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1248 (1988)




common law and statutory law-they are smitten with the apparent
responsiveness of common law reasoning to the economic considerations they
champion, in contrast with the erratic outputs of democracy.52 But this preference
does not rest on any substantive distinction between private and public law. It
reflects only a judgment about the quality of decision-making by various state
institutions. As legal categories, the concepts of public and private are
epiphenomenal.
Unlike legal economists, philosophers of private law take the distinction
between public and private law very seriously. They emphasize the bilateral
structure of private law-i.e., that private law vindicates private rights held by
private persons against one another.5 3 Individuals do not file claims for
compensation from the state (as they do in worker compensation schemes, for
example). They instead address their claims against hat private person who was
responsible for their harm, and their claim is evaluated in the language of
responsibility. The duties defendants are alleged to have breached run directly
toward the plaintiff. And the remedy is paid directly from the defendant to the
plaintiff.
Bilateralism is an important and defining feature of private law (or as I
argue below, its method) but it does too much work in some private law accounts.
As a distinctive feature, we must be able to account for it; but it need not be the
essential feature around which our theories of private law revolve.5 4 In the
philosophical literature at present, bilateralism threatens to crowd out the
interests and concerns of third parties, denying them any role in detennining the
rights and duties that two people hold against each other.55
This narrow focus on parties to particular disputes follows from the natural
law character of some private law theory.56 In some views, people in a state of
as "tenuous and radically contingent"); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91
GEo. L.J. 695, 702-09 (2003); see also Henry E. Smith & Thomas W. Merrill, Ill YALE L.J. 357 (2001)
(describing the ad hoc character of legal economics explanations of property rules).
52. The foundational works on the efficiency of the common law are George L. Priest,
The Common Law Process and the Selection ofEfficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); and Paul H.
Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). See also Nuno Garoupa & Carlos
G6mez Ligilerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 287 (2011)
(surveying the legal economic literature on the common law).
53. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 50, at 13-23; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 114-44 (1995); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and
Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 299, 304 (2011).
54. Jody Kraus has defended legal economists' perspective on bilateralism as a second-
best institutional arrangement. Jody Kraus, supra note 50, at 336-42 (2007).
55. See Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 197-202 (Klass, Letsas, & Saprai, eds., 2014) (describing and rejecting
bilateralism as a reason for excluding considerations of distributive justice from contract regulation); Aditi
Bagchi, Parallel Contract, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 139 (2013) (describing the dyadic presumption in contract
and its inadequacy in the face of parallel contracts).
56. See, e.g., Nathan Oman, Promise and Private Law, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935,
955 (2012) (summarizing civil recourse as: "When the social contract forming the state is made, we give
to the state our natural right to enforce natural law, and in return the state provides us with a system of
private law by which we can exercise our natural right to 'seek reparation from him that has done' us
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nature have rights against each other that map onto the rights now protected by
private law. The state steps in to prevent violence, or alternatively, to vindicate
rights that could not be properly adjudicated outside of civil society. To the
extent our present rights derive from "natural rights," one might suppose they are
unmediated by public norms and the public interest.
But this natural law cast is at odds with current understandings of the
legitimate scope of state power, or even with the necessary mandate of a just
state. There is no reason to believe that rights recognized in positive law (like
contract law) are merely derivative from those that might apply in a state of
nature. The principles of justice that govern modem society may supply content
not only to legal relations between the state and its citizens but also to relations
between citizens.
Private law theorists do not expressly deny that the public interest and
political values substantiate the bilateral moral relation of private parties, but
they do not usually refer to those general values in their elaboration of private
moral relations, except at the highest level of generality (as, for example, in the
defensibility of a regime of private property).8 In their picture of the relationship
between private morality and private law, private law is usually called upon to
accommodate or support private morality; the content of what is good and right
between two people does not seem to turn on anything else happening in law.59
Indeed, it is this tendency of private law theory to zoom too closely in upon the
two adversaries in a contract dispute that explains the failure of formal theories
of contract interpretation to adequately incorporate third party interests. By
taking the system of adversarial adjudication of private rights as their starting
point, philosophers of private law risk a rather insular picture of private law in
which its goals and methods do not reference what is happening in other parts of
the law.60
wrong."); see also Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 60-62 (2006) (describing the natural law origins and persistent rhetoric of natural
rights in private law).
57. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 49 (1999) (rejecting libertarianism).
58. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72
FORDHAM L. REv. 1811 (2004) (defending an autonomous private law that upholds resource allocations
separately regulated by public principles of justice); Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and
Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 91-93 (1995) (contrasting corrective and distributive justice).
59. See, e.g., Jody Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1603 (2009) (arguing that contract law effectuates natural liberty interests in the promissory
power); Daniel Markovits, Contracts and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004) (describing the
relational value of promises and contracts and how they are supported by contract law); Seana Shiffrin,
The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) (arguing that too great a
divergence between contract and promise undermines citizens' ability to behave morally within
promissory relationships).
60. For the strongest defense of the autonomy of private law, see WEINRIB, supra
note53, at 1, 5, 8, 13. For in-depth treatment of the interface between private law and public values, see




Other scholars today deny altogether that there is any meaningful
distinction between public and private law.61 They are right to be skeptical about
the very ambition of line-drawing. No theoretical account of the distinction
between public and private law maps onto our ordinary usage of the terms. For
example, in everyday parlance we often refer to any kind of law regulating
economic activity as private law, regardless of the method of regulation. That
use of language is ideological: Its effect of classifying economic activity, like
family life, as private is to shield presumptively even wrongful acts in those
spheres from regulation. This Article does not subscribe to any such presumption
and denies that the boundary between private and public law is best drawn by
reference to the nature of the activity being governed. It might be the case that
some kinds of individual and social activities tend to be regulated more heavily
by methods associated with private or public law; there is nothing morally
compulsory about the matching of method to subject matter and economic
activity, in particular, may be regulated in both ways. One of the ambitions of
this Article is to redeem the distinction between public and private law in a way
that acknowledges an important and intuitive difference, and one that justifies
our ongoing use of the terms, but avoids the misleading implications of current
usage.
B. The State Mandate to Prevent Harm, and the Broad Concept of a Legal
Interest
We can make a more useful distinction between public and private law than
the ones now available by shifting away from a focus on the kinds of conduct
that law regulates to the kinds of harm different regulatory methods are designed
to prevent. Before matching method to purpose, it is helpful first to observe some
of the common purposes served by legal intervention more broadly.
In liberal states, one of the primary motives for state action is the prevention
of harm. Indeed, judges and scholars of liberalism sometimes invoke harm as the
exclusive basis for regulating conduct (the "harm principle").62 The capacity of
a state to protect citizens from injury is among its raisons d 'tre.
The injuries from which the state protects us are not limited to bodily injury;
they include a range of material harms. The vast apparatuses of the criminal and
tort regimes are devoted in part to protection of property. That commitment of
state resources attests to a general consensus that material resources are
important to the pursuit of individual life plans, and liberal states facilitate those
61. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
62. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) ("[T]he sole end for
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number, is. . . to prevent harm to others."). For discussion of the harm principle in relation to law,
see H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963), which debates Lord Patrick Devlin on the
propriety of enforcing moral norms; and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), which contrasts
legitimate state regulation of harm with illegitimate regulation of non-harmful conduct.
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plans by promoting stability and material independence. Although the focus of
liberal states on harm is associated with a hands-off form of government, this
mandate authorizes intervention in numerous spheres of human activity,
including areas we might be tempted to regard as "private."
Private actions often result in harms to others, or negative externalities. 6
Not all externalities are legally cognizable harms. Most economic harm imposed
on competitors in the course of business does not trigger legal redress. Free-
standing economic losses not associated with any physical injury are not usually
recoverable in tort due to the economic loss doctrine.6 5 People are able to harm
others in a variety of ways that do not generate a private right of action. Only
when we burden a legally recognized entitlement does the law undertake either
to deter us from imposing externalities on others or force compensation. When I
refer throughout to "minimizing externalities," I refer only to minimizing harm
to a legal interest.
Although this discussion is limited to harms that implicate legally protected
interests, it is not limited to harms that result from actual infringement of
established property rights. The notion of a legally protected interest is more
expansive. Although we might associate the concept of infringement with full-
blown property rights, legal entitlements include interests protected by liability
rules.66 Property rules protect entitlements in the way that we ordinarily associate
with property rights: transfer requires consent of the owner at a mutually agreed
price. By contrast, an entitlement protected only by a liability rule allows
nonconsensual transfer at a price fixed after the fact by a court in the form of
damages.6 7 For example, our legal interest in crossing the street safely gives rise
only to a private right of action for damages in tort when a driver fails to exercise
reasonable care. Likewise, breach of contract-or "taking" of a contractual
entitlement--ordinarily gives rise only to a claim for expectation damages."
Some actions we might not ordinarily characterize as infringement of a legal
interest nevertheless create a duty to compensate. The corresponding right to
63. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 93 (1971) ("[T]hough men's rational plans do
have different final ends, they nevertheless all require for their execution certain primary goods, natural
and social."). Stability and material independence are primary goods that can be applied toward a range
of conceptions of the good.
64. See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1641, 1642-44,
1649-51 (2011) (defining and discussing negative externalities).
65. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 452, at 1282, 1285-87 (2000); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 251 (1987).
66. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); see also Ian Ayres & J.M.
Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703
(1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis,
109 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1996).
67. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note66, at 1106-10.





legal recourse reflects a legal interest.69 Tortious conduct often merely
undermines the utility or value of property without usurping dominion over the
property per se. Breaches of contract infringe legal interests broadly conceived
before there has been any transfer of a traditional property right.
Legal interests protected by liability rules are not to be taken lightly. The
state might refuse to recognize a full-blown property right only because it
anticipates that the cost of negotiating its transfer is excessively high, not because
it does not deem the interest an important one. For example, we protect people
from bodily injury that is the result of careless driving only through liability
rules.70 Although few interests are more sacrosanct than bodily integrity,
protecting that legal interest with a property rule is not practical. It is not possible
for car drivers to negotiate consensual transfer of their future victims' interest in
bodily integrity. Protecting bodily integrity with a property rule would only serve
to criminalize every car accident.
Where we expect compensation for infringement of a legal interest to be
inadequate, as in most private suits, the state sometimes supplements one legal
regime with another. For example, we supplement private securities litigation
with public enforcement actions.7 1 The two-prong strategy reflects the distinct
value of each regulatory method, not just the limitations of either.72 We would
not be prepared to swallow the costs of overlapping regulatory methods were we
satisfied with the level of deterrence achieved by either standing alone. Some
types of securities fraud are criminalized, but there is a great deal of conduct that
subjects one to civil liability without the risk of criminal prosecution.7 ' Hybrid
regimes reflect a commitment to increasing substantially the costs of producing
externalities even where we are not prepared to criminalize or absolutely deter
certain conduct.74 They also reveal the overlapping purposes of quite varied
enforcement regimes; a single legal interest may motivate a variety of
institutional responses.
This institutional variety shows, in turn, that a legal interest may be
manifest even where it is not backed by legal recourse-i.e., even when there is
69. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (describing a variety of legal interests and their
relation to legal recourse for others' failure to comply with legal duties).
70. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 66, at 1108.
71. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
72. For the distinct value associated with private rights of action, see H. Miles Foy, III,
Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal
Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 584-85 (1986); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New
Approach to the Enforcement ofRights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678-79 (1987). For
the distinct value associated with public rights of action, see Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights ofAction,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (2014).
73. For discussion of public and private enforcement methods in the context of
securities regulation, see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement ofRule l0b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008).
74. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1346 (1991).
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no liability rule protection. The concept of a legal interest is not limited to
entitlements protected by either a property or liability rule. We should understand
the state's mandate to regulate externalities to extend beyond entitlement
protection because some commonly accepted methods of deterring externalities
do not piggyback on anyone's legal entitlement. For example, taxes on certain
harmful behaviors (e.g., smoking) may be intended to benefit either the general
public or some group, but those beneficiaries have no legal entitlement in
connection with the scheme. The notion of a legal interest is intended to capture
material interests that manifest in some legal scheme even where that scheme
does not take the form of a legal entitlement.
There is yet another reason we should include burdens on non-entitled legal
interests even where those do not amount to legal entitlements in our concept of
third party harms. Many legal rules intended to minimize externalities operate as
second-best strategies. They reflect the limits of legal institutions. If underlying
interests could manifest in entitlements, and those entitlements could be
specified precisely at low cost, it would not be necessary to enact a "floating"
regime to deter externalities. So, for example, if property rights detailed air
quality rights in all space, no additional legislation regulating pollution would be
necessary. Each person affected by the pollution could sue to uphold her property
right in her little piece of air. Of course, such a method of regulating air quality
is absurd: we can neither map our interest in decent air onto legal entitlements,
nor could we coordinate millions of suits against a polluter for each trespass. The
transaction costs of ex ante specification drive the need for a protective regime
separate from the normal enforcement of property rights.
This second-best character of many legal rules implies that the boundaries
of legal entitlements do not capture the scope of legally protected interests. For
example, even if the business judgment rule protects directors from liability for
certain kinds of decisions due to the costs of specifying duties and adjudicating
their breach, shareholders have a legal interest in more robust deliberative
practices.75 The enforceable right validates and identifies a legal interest even if
it does not perfectly protect it.
The upshot of the discussion so far is that the law does not attempt to
insulate us from all harms posed by others. It regulates externalities in order to
protect legal interests. Those legal interests extend beyond classic property rights
and even other enforceable entitlements.
75. Delaware law "presumes that 'in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.' Those presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the
directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the
burden then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was
entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders." In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d




C. Concentrated and Difuse Externalities
We can now distinguish between concentrated and diffuse externalities. We
usually think of externalities as diffuse, i.e., gains from private conduct are
concentrated but their costs are borne by the public at large.76 For example, a
manufacturer that pollutes does so at private gain but the public at large bears the
cost. Some externalities, however, are borne by a subset of the public. For
example, if the manufacturer is not just dirty but also loud, only its neighbors
will bear the cost of its noise pollution, not the public at large. The smaller the
number of persons affected by some private action, the more concentrated the
externality. Concentration is a continuous property not just because more or
fewer people can be affected but because the proportion of the total externalities
generated may be concentrated or diffuse. For example, even air pollution may
have disproportionate effects on neighbors. The more disproportionately
externalities fall on a small group, the more concentrated the externality.
We should distinguish concentrated and diffuse externalities on another
dimension as well. Some externalities fall on persons that are identifiable ex ante
(before the activity at issue is undertaken) while others are borne by individuals
identifiable only after the externality has been generated. As the terminology is
used here, an externality is more concentrated where losers are identifiable in
advance.
There is no consistent, clear boundary between diffuse and concentrated
externalities. Consumers of a mass product might be regarded as diffuse while
consumers in a small market might be concentrated. Neighbors of a single plant
might be regarded as concentrated while neighbors of all plants utilizing certain
machinery might be regarded as diffuse. The aim here is to draw an analytic
distinction that I will next map onto distinct regulatory strategies. Of course, an
optimal regulatory strategy is no more clear-cut han the underlying features on
which it turns.
D. The Basic Division ofLabor
We have a variety of methods for dealing with externalities. Ideally, we
induce private actors to internalize the costs of their own actions so that they do
not "overproduce." We often do this by way of public regulation. For example,
we might impose a tax on conduct that produces externalities, as we do in the
case of cigarette taxes. Or we can directly limit a group's ability to act in harmful
ways, as we do in the case of clean air regulations.7
76. See NOLAN H. MILLER, NOTES ON MICROECONOMIc THEORY 212 (2006)
("Examples of externalities and public goods tend to overlap. It is hard to say what is an externality and
what is a public good. This is as you would expect, since the two categories are really just different ways
of talking about goods with non-private aspects.").
77. For discussion of the complex array of regulatory instruments, and the interplay
between tax and traditional liability and property rules, see Andrew Blair-Stanek, Tax in the Cathedral:
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Tax, 99 VA. L. REV. 1169 (2013) (arguing that the response to
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Still another alternative is to induce people to internalize costs by
structuring entitlements in private law just so. For example, through tort law we
can make actors pay for the accidents they cause.7 8 That is, we use the right of
victims to seek redress for negligently inflicted bodily injury to prevent drivers
from driving in a way that is good for them but bad for others. Where social
harms are jointly produced, however, it is more costly to induce full
internalization of costs in this way.79 Although the basic contours of private
entitlements are known to persons as they make choices, the precise boundaries
of private entitlements are elaborated through the resolution of bilateral
disputes.80 This ex post method does not generate as much clarity as the ex ante
pronouncements of regulatory standards conveyed by statute or administrative
rules, but it allows flexible accommodation between interests that have a stake
in a particular part of an entitlement's boundary. The resolution of each dispute
adds clarity to those with similar entitlements, but duties in private law remain
characteristically vague in comparison to those specified in public law.
Although both public and private law methods of mitigating externalities
involve legal rules that are to some extent specified ex ante, the enforcement
costs of regulation are borne ex ante in the case of public regulation and ex post
in the case of private adjudication. Legislative and administrative action is
required to set up any public regulatory scheme. That requires political
mobilization by representatives of the adversely affected private groups;8
successful political bargaining;82 allocation of resources to the enforcement
violations of requirements of a tax status may take the form of either property or liability rules); and
Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule,
and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979) (comparing merits of tax-subsidy approach to
those of liability and property rules in limiting externalities).
78. Under a negligence rule, we make people pay for only those accidents that they
cause negligently-i.e., only wrongdoers are tortfeasors. A strict liability rule would make people pay
more broadly for all the losses they cause, under some socially constructed rules of causation. Cf GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (advocating a tort system that requires tortfeasors to pay
all costs of accidents that they cause).
79. See Ellen Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REv. 977 (2003)
(describing normative principles that limit comparative fault doctrines).
80. Cf Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory ofContract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 301-
02 (1986) ("An entitlements theory demands that the boundaries of protected domains be ascertainable,
not only by judges who must resolve disputes that have arisen, but, perhaps more importantly, by the
affected persons themselves before any dispute occurs."). Although most observers would agree that it is
preferable to have clear boundaries set in advance of disputes, those disputes presumably arise because
boundaries are in fact not well-delineated and, in these cases, can be settled only through litigation.
81. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & T. WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR:
OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL
PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981) (describing mobilization of coal producers
and their impact on the implementation of the Clean Air Act); ROBERT KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL
DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED 150-151 (1986) (describing
mobilization of interest groups representing disabled persons and their effect on the regulation of
transportation).
82. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 112 (2009) (describing the public choice account of legislative bargaining); David
Baron & John Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1181 (1989) (presenting a




regime;8 3 gathering of technical expertise and drafting of appropriate
regulations.8 4 By contrast, especially in common law systems, private law
entitlements that cause parties to internalize the costs of their own conduct are
developed through case law. There are few enforcement costs pecific to any one
sort of externality; costs are absorbed into the judicial system as a whole.
Although precedent establishes legal rules of which parties are on notice prior to
engaging in conduct, the prospective wrongdoer does not know exactly how
much he will have to hand over until after the fact-after the injured party sues
and the matter is resolved by court order or settlement.85
These differences make public law regulation of particular externalities
more costly, on the margin, than private law methods. But implicit regulation
through the structure of entitlements generates costs of its own. The fluid, multi-
sourced process of case resolution creates inconsistent rules and results. Vague
entitlements render liability unpredictable.86 In the best case scenario, non-
overlapping jurisdiction means courts work out answers to the same questions
redundantly.
Public law and private law regulation are thus associated with different
kinds of costs. The costs of private law regulation are especially problematic with
respect to diffuse externalities while the costs of public law regulation are
especially high with respect to concentrated externalities.
The private law method of regulation is inapt for many kinds of diffuse
externalities. Practically, where the harm to any single actor is nominal, she lacks
incentive to bring suit.87 Contingent fee and class action arrangements go some
way toward motivating private actors to bear the risks and costs associated with
mass litigation, but our system of adversarial adjudication makes it difficult to
resolve matters that concern multiple parties at once.88 Strict requirements for
standing and robust norms of due process make it difficult to impose any final
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1998) (noting that public choice theory
characterizes the regulatory process as a series of "regulatory trades" among "organized subgroups of the
citizenry").
83. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999) (arguing that enforcement regimes are ineffective without allocation of
adequate resources to them).
84. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement ofPublic Policy,
3 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 187 (1985) (describing the "enormous volume of technical and economic data"
required in auto safety regulations).
85. See MITCHEL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW & ECONOMICS 39-52, 67-74
(2d ed. 1989).
86. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992) (describing various advantages of respective types of legal rules); Thomas Merrill, Trespass,
Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 24 (1985); Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988) (discussing the effect of vagueness
in property entitlements); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
87. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 349-50; Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman,
Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility ofEntrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U.
PA. L. REv. 103, Ill (2006).
88. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model ofAdjudication, 89 GEO. L.J.
371, 418-32 (2001) (describing the nonadversarial character of class action settlements).
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judgment on parties without their affirmative consent or participation.89 These
barriers to binding adjudication on a mass scale mean that unless individual
litigants win punitive damages (always a speculative prospect), they are not
motivated to litigate most diffuse externalities.90
The ad hoc quality of private law adjudication is also especially problematic
for diffuse externalities. If the essential trade-off is between flexibility and
consistency, private law adjudication's virtue of organic law-making in response
to particular facts of developed cases is also its major vice. Judges with limited
jurisdiction crafting narrow ex post responses to diffuse externalities are not
trying to optimize the allocation of social resources so much as they are trying to
restore fairness as between the few litigants before the court. They will take into
account details that are important to the equities of a case but may not be so
important to the systemic resolution of a social problem.91 Most importantly,
judges will make these calls differently, with the result that a single defendant
will be subject to different rules (or different prices for behavior that generates
comparable social costs) and similarly situated plaintiffs will be differently
compensated. The flexibility of this mode of regulation is a good fit for
concentrated externalities, each of which comes with its own rich fact pattern
and litigants eager to distinguish themselves from their predecessors and
neighbors. But it makes for ad hoc regulation of behaviors that affect many
people similarly and simultaneously.
The limited competence of judges gives rise to still another problem with
regulating diffuse externalities through the ex post boundary-drawing and price
setting of private adjudication. Judges can only offer remedies. These remedies
may have the effect of structuring entitlements; they make it possible for
individuals to pursue some uses without fear of liability and make it possible for
others to pursue recourse for injury. But they can only indirectly require
affirmative acts. Positive injunctions are few and far between precisely because
they invoke a state power not normally allowed the judicial branch.92 Courts are
89. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 267 (2011) ("[C]losure collides with consent"); Alexandra Lahav, Symmetry and
Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1520 (2013) ("Participation is mostly not available in
class actions"); Richard Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105,
1148, 1157 (2010) (arguing that class action litigation alone does not solve problems of consent and
closure).
90. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
91. The influence of legal realism has made us comfortable with courts' responsiveness
to the particular facts of individual cases, as well as their implicit invocation of larger trends in social
values. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEx. L. REV.
267, 275-76 (1997) (discussing how legal realism holds that judges respond to facts of cases and broad
policy objectives). But there is a tension between these commitments. The facts of a case speak to the
equities between the parties that may not resonate with broader policy goals. But see Hanoch Dagan, The
Realist Conception ofLaw, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 649-51 (2007) (attempting to reconcile engagement
with facts and extralegal norms).
92. See Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in





not in the business of crafting solutions to social problems but rather of
controlling damage after the fact.93 Large regulatory questions call for large
coordinated policy responses and courts cannot deliver those without
overstepping their institutional role. Even elected judges were not elected with
the mandate to make value-laden large-scale policy choices; their separate
powers are limited to resolving cases and controversies (as embodied in the
standing requirement).94
Just as private law adjudication is ill-suited for regulating diffuse
externalities, public law is not usually a promising method of managing
concentrated externalities. As noted above, the usual public law responses to
externalities are costly because they require ex ante state action, usually by the
legislative or executive (administrative) branches. Although diffuse externalities
raise a host of their own public choice problems, concentrated externalities pose
special problems of governance. Concentrated externalities may be first, unlikely
to trigger public response; second, difficult to mitigate by general policy; and
third, optimistically relegated to markets for correction.
First, there is unlikely to be sufficient political will to solve a problem of
concentrated externalities that fall on weak or disorganized parties. The logic of
collective action identified by Mancur Olsen might be read to suggest
otherwise--concentrated interests are more likely to be organized and less likely
to suffer from collective action problems, and therefore well-positioned to exact
more than their fair share of attention from political processes.95 Congressional
activity indeed reflects remarkable solicitude for well-organized and well-funded
interests, however concentrated.96 But these Congressional interventions
represent only the pinnacle of state attention. The prospects for organized
pressure on behalf of a public law solution depend on the cohesion and clout of
the particular group that bears a concentrated externality.
Most concentrated externalities are not borne by people with the resources
to extract a legislative solution to their problems. No matter how extensively
legislative and administrative activity is distorted by imperfect public decision-
making processes, it is the high proportion of resources devoted to solving the
93. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the use of structural injunctions because ajudge "will inevitably be required to make very broad empirical
predictions necessarily based in large part upon policy views."); ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD,
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE (2003) (arguing that injunctions intended to further public policy have not been
effective); Alan Chen, Rights Lawyer Essentialism and the Next Generation of Rights Critics, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 903, 919 (2013) ("Class actions and structural injunctions cannot be sufficiently tailored to
produce balanced, context-sensitive solutions to the complex and entrenched nature of the underlying
causes of major social problems.");. But see OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978)
(defending the role of structural injunctions in effectuating constitutional values).
94. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
95. See generally MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
96. See T. FERGUSON, GOLDEN RULE: THE INVESTMENT THEORY OF PARTY
COMPETITION AND THE LOGIC OF MONEY-DRIVEN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1995); W. GREIDER, SECRETS
OF THE TEMPLE (1989); Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the
Mobilization ofBias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 797 (1990).
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problems of a few relative to their proportion of the population that is shocking.
In absolute terms, most legislative and executive action is still devoted to
advancing the public interest broadly construed. Although concentrated interests
are better positioned to overcome some hurdles to collective action, the majority
lack resources even to seek out legislative or administrative action. Nor do
legislative committees and administrative agencies seek them out.
Subcommittees and agencies devote their limited resources to investigating and
policing the high-profile externalities that motivate their founding. Their priority
is understandably to address diffuse harms to the public, not localized
discontents.97
A second related reason should lead us to expect that public regulation will
consistently overlook concentrated externalities: Concentrated externalities are
more expensive to regulate by public law than diffuse externalities.9 8 Generality
of harm generates regulatory economies of scale. It is more effective to allocate
a quantum of regulatory effort for a single problem of overproduction that affects
many people than for hundreds of situations that collectively affect a comparable
number of people. Although expertise may carry over from one localized
problem to another, each concentrated externality comes with its own facts and
micro-economy. The cost of developing a tailored regime for each situation is
prohibitively high. While courts do something like this through adjudication, the
same focused nature of the judicial inquiry that limits the range of tools available
to them also renders fact-specific response feasible. As noted above,
policymakers expend their resources to solve the problems of small numbers only
when the political process is not operating properly.
Concentrated externalities are more expensive to regulate through public
law but characterization of an externality as concentrated presumes a particular
framing of the problem.99 We observed that the line between concentrated and
diffuse externalities is vague and depends on definition. Even where the losers
from particular decisions, such as the decision of a particular manufacturer to
operate a loud machine at night, are concentrated, the type of behavior may be
so pervasive that victims from the practice are diffuse. If a few people are
bothered by one loud machine, it may be prohibitively expensive to create a
97. For an analysis of the ways in and reasons for which legislatures are responsive to
diffuse interests, see DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); Michael
Bailey, Quiet Influence: The Representation of Difuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983-94, 26 LEGAL
STUD. Q. 45, 47-50 (2001); and James Stimson, Michael Mackuen & Robert Erikson, Dynamic
Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 543 (1995)..
98 I refer to the state costs of regulation rather than the private costs that may result
from regulation. However, these costs are related in that the more cheaply and ineptly public rules are
designed, the higher the privately-bome costs of regulation.
99. One might compare the difficulties of characterizing third parties as diffuse or
concentrated to the problem ofdefining a market in merger regulation. See James S. Venit, The Evaluation
ofConcentrations Under Regulation 4064/89: The Nature ofthe Beast, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND
JOINT VENTURES 213 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991) (suggesting that vagueness in market definition standards
is an important flaw in regulatory analysis). Although a substantial decision in itself, it does not undermine




regulatory framework for the isolated noise-maker; and then the next nuisance,
and the one after that. But if many people are affected by the industrial practice
of using a type of machinery, public regulation can regulate the machinery.
Whether a public law response is feasible depends then on whether the
circumstantial facts that differentiate particular losers from each other are
important to calibrating a state response.
To continue with the example of loud machinery, policymakers might
create a regulation that limits noise, fine in proportion to noise, tax the production
associated with the noise or-going the private law route-create a tort right for
some people affected by the nuisance. A general noise regulation, a fine, or tax
all must be promulgated at a high level of generality and applied uniformly to
situations that will invariably differ in some respects. When the differences are
important to the price the polluter should pay or the compensation to which the
loser is entitled, private adjudication is the only way to process those facts and
adjust price and remedy accordingly. My initial definition of concentrated
externalities as ones that are borne by a few people usually identifiable in
advance assumes a high degree of uniformity within the group, just as a diffuse
externality is presumed to be one that is largely the same for all those who bear
it.
Once a call is made about the significance of variation, we can say those
externalities which are deemed relatively homogenous among a concentrated
group but disparate as between groups are more expensive to regulate through
public law. Those harms are less conducive to a general conduct standard or ex
ante pricing (perhaps the noise level should vary depending on location or pitch)
and the particular identity of those on whom harm is inflicted may be relevant to
its magnitude. In these cases, it would be expensive to devise a highly tailored
public regulation that governs behavior ex ante. There are hybrid possibilities: in
some cases policymakers can at fairly low cost mitigate some externalities of
private behavior through a clear standard (e.g., a speed limit) but can only with
difficulty craft standards to govern externalities (e.g., from negligent driving) at
the margin.
The final reason we can expect a muted public response to concentrated
externalities is that policymakers (and especially legal scholars) are inclined to
think that the market will resolve concentrated externalities without intervention.
Absent transaction costs, Coasian bargaining would achieve optimal allocation
of resources and the distinction between diffuse and concentrated externalities
would be irrelevant.100 Taking those costs into account, since bargaining costs
are lower where a limited number of private actors are implicated by the conduct
at issue, we might expect those adversely affected by conduct to pay the right
person to stop it, at least where externalities are concentrated. Unfortunately, our
optimism should be tempered by the probability of bargaining failure in
100. See R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960); see also
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966).
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situations of bilateral monopoly and the limits of contract enforcement.o' It will
be costly for adversely affected parties to contract for protection against
concentrated externalities and, should they manage contract, the high costs of
policing opportunism may render it difficult to enforce any rights they obtain.10 2
These transaction costs may not be highly visible to regulators, however, who
rationally direct their resources to diffuse externalities for which the prospects of
Coasian bargaining are even dimmer.
Those are three reasons (of admittedly mixed realist and functional quality)
why public law is an inadequate means for regulating externalities, especially
concentrated externalities. Together with the systemic inadequacy of private law
to handle diffuse externalities, we have the foundations for a rough division of
labor. Where private actions burden legal interests of a large number of
anonymous people, we can expect a public regulatory response. Where private
actions illegitimately transfer costs to a select and identifiable few, those
burdened few are expected to seek recourse through private litigation.
III. Minimizing Concentrated Externalities in Private Law
Public law responds to externalities by taxing (including fines and fees) and
by directly policing conduct. Private law induces optimal conduct differently.
Conduct that impinges on legally protected interests may result in liability but
the amount of liability is not just a function of the conduct and its type, as is
normally the case in public law. Instead, the amount of liability turns on wrongful
injury to a particular private person, and the amount of damages will reflect facts
about the plaintiff and the peculiarities of her situation.103 In other words,
consequences in public law depend on what you do. By contrast, consequences
in private law depend in part on the person whom you harm.
As in public law, the triggering act need not amount to a full-fledged moral
wrong. But it must invade someone's protected interest, and-unlike in public
law-she decides whether to initiate legal action. The plaintiff bears the burden
of showing that a duty was breached and (usually) that it resulted in quantifiable
damages.104 The court formally adjudicates that claim as if only the interests of
the given plaintiff and defendant are at stake.
101. Bilateral monopoly is present where there is a single seller and single buyer who
must reach agreement with each other. It applies where a prospective generator of externalities must agree
on the price of forbearance with the unique individual that would be harmed by her activity. See THOMAS
MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 138 (1997) (describing bilateral monopoly).
102. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 356, 356-61 (1980) (stating that high information costs and monitoring
costs make it impossible to negotiate or enforce complete contracts).
103. See Benjamin Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1757, 1780 (2012) ("[L]iability is rooted in a particular injuring of the plaintiff [and] that injury
itself provides an anchor for the determination of the magnitude of deprivation the defendant may face").
104. In tort, plaintiffs must establish the existence of a duty to her from the defendant
and show that its breach caused her damages. Similarly, in contract, plaintiff must establish a contractual




The pairing of wrongdoer with victim, or plaintiff with defendant, in private
litigation is known as its bilateral structure. As discussed above, the outsized role
of plaintiffs in private law has led some theorists to conclude that the bilateral
structure of private law is not just defining but essential.'0 5 But though the
plaintiff exercises substantial control over the fact and quantum of liability,
neither her agency nor her interests are entirely controlling. Whether legislatures
and courts recognize a private right of action and the amounts they allow a
plaintiff to recover do not reflect any inherent rights she bears as a person or
property-holder. The nature of her legal recourse turns instead on how we choose
to balance the interests of persons similarly situated against o hers who are
limited by the boundaries of their legal rights. Where the burdens associated with
a defendant's actions are concentrated on a few, it might make sense to allow
only them (or only one person) to pursue a legal claim. But that legal claim is
shaped by the interests of others even when it is litigated in an adversarial dispute
between two parties.
One might worry that characterizing private law in this way implies that the
litigants are being used to pursue social ends.'06 To the contrary, litigants are
using the courts. But courts open their doors with the aim of vindicating a system
of rights and responsibilities, not only the rights of the particular few who appear
before them. Although the court must decide the merits of a given legal claim by
reference to the rights of the litigants, their very (costly) presence in court
suggests that those rights have been inadequately specified to date and the way
in which the court substantiates them in that instance will be informed by the
interests of others. The court allocates losses between two parties with an eye to
the entitlements that this immediate allocation implies for the many others not
party to the dispute.
As Coase famously observed, the allocation of private entitlements would
have only distributional consequences if individuals could resort to them
effectively through bargaining.'07 Those distributional consequences are
important. But entitlements are not resorted optimally, in any event. The cost of
identifying partners for trade and agreeing upon terms is prohibitive. Transaction
costs make it necessary to structure entitlements deliberately in a way calculated
to minimize negative externalities. The broad default sweep of property rights
creates conditions under which individuals have the capacity to create
externalities. Those rights are then tempered by offsetting rights in others. The
"corrective rights" are protected by liability rules, which can be understood to
elements of their claims by the "preponderance of the evidence." See Jones v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 325
S.E.2d 237, 241 (N.C. 1985) ("[T]he standard of proof applicable to ordinary civil actions .., is proof by
the preponderance of the evidence"); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (John William Strong et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1992) (stating that the plaintiff's burden of proof in civil cases is generally by preponderance of
evidence).
105. See supra note 53.
106. See WEINRIB, supra note 53, at 40-42 (deploring the use of private law to pursue
public policy objectives).
107. See Coase, supra note 100.
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guard against concentrated externalities, including but not limited to those borne
by plaintiffs.
Consider two examples of this dynamic. First, two neighbors with
potentially conflicting uses determine whose use will prevail, or who will bear
the cost of rendering them compatible. One has a dog that barks continuously.
The other has a baby that sleeps a lot. The basic allocation of property rights
makes it possible that these two persons will own and use property side-by-side
and does not resolve whether the dog-owner may keep a dog that barks as much
as it does. A public noise regulation might specify the permitted decibel level.
But it might take a nuisance suit to decide the boundaries between the neighbors'
property rights. Two aspects of the latter method of specifying entitlements are
worth noting. First, adjudication would be more fine-grained than a blanket rule
on permissible decibels. Adversarial adjudication could differentiate, for
example, between a dog, a rooster or a colicky baby as sources of sound, deeming
one more acceptable than another. Second, private law adjudication would
decide the immediate question of whether one of the neighbors could continue
in a given use but it would also take into account facts about the society in which
the neighbors are situated, including its relative valuation of various land uses.
Only the noise concerns of the upset neighbor would be on trial but the interests
of others in making and avoiding that noise (and similar noise) would be taken
into account in deciding the rights of the two neighbors as against one another.
Consider next an employment agreement hat prohibits the employee from
working for a rival firm within a five mile radius of the employer's firm for five
years after the employment relationship ends (a noncompete provision). The very
reason for leaving such a condition of employment to the private agreement of
the parties, rather than specifying them by regulation or statute, is that the parties
may arrive at a better rule for themselves-more informed by their particular
facts-than would a third party regulator. But their agreement may be ambiguous
about which firms qualify as competitors of the employer, and it may be unclear
whether the restriction applies where the employer has terminated the employee
without cause. How a court interprets this agreement may be driven primarily by
the customary questions centered on party intent. But it may also take into
account third party interests, including the interests of consumers and rival firms
in a free labor market. The ex post and limited nature of the inquiry makes it
possible for courts to take into account a rich set of facts in interpreting the
restrictive term, and the interests of third party losers may cut in favor of a narrow
reading. Notably, courts frequently strike down noncompete clauses as
inconsistent with public policy.'08 The relevant public policy interests do not
disappear when those clauses are enforceable; though the dispute is bilateral,
third party interests should inform the contract's interpretation.
108. See Kyle B. Sill, Drafting Effective Noncompete Clauses and Other Restrictive
Clauses: Considerations Across the United States, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 365 (2013) (surveying the




The first example above (in tort) is less controvertible than the second (in
contract); the aim of this Article is to extend the logic that explains the first to
the second. I argued above that the line between diffuse and concentrated
externalities-indeed, even the porous nature of that divide -corresponds to the
kinds of harms we expect to be handled by public and private law, respectively.
While we tend to regulate diffuse externalities by way of tax and mandatory
standards, we regulate concentrated externalities by the contours of private
entitlements. Ex ante rules that are deliberately designed to police particular
classes of externalities are more cost-effective with respect to diffuse
externalities while structured entitlements that we enforce largely through ex
post remedial measures are usually the most effective way to limit concentrated
externalities.
This way of thinking about externalities helps highlight one obvious respect
in which private law rights and duties are "private." The more localized and
specific the harm from a private action, the more likely that we recognize a
private right against that harm. We should not expect the public and private
distinction to turn on the activity at issue.109 Since some actions produce
concentrated and diffuse social harm, the same activity (e.g., driving) may be
regulated by public and private law. Since some externalities are not easily
classified as diffuse or concentrated, it is not surprising that there is no sharp line
between public and private law in practice, even where a useful analytic and
institutional distinction is to be made.
The private law theory literature tends to treat the institutional fact of
bilateralism (i.e., remedies available to private individuals against each other) as
the essential feature of private law.1 0 It is certainly a defining feature in that we
can usefully identify private law as that which is subject to private adjudication.
But however important this may be as a feature to be explained, it is
unsatisfactory as an account of why certain rights end up operationalized in this
fashion. Even if vindicating rights in this manner effectuates certain values
associated with private recourse and private accountability, why do some
antisocial behaviors end up generating private rights of action while others are
regulated directly? Although myriad considerations speak to the optimal legal
form of any public objective, the scope of harm is a natural focus when we think
about the substantive distinction between public and private breaches. Thinking
about how the optimal policy response to externalities depends on their degree
of diffusion helps make sense of the contrasting regulatory methods of direct
regulation, on the one hand, and privately justiciable rights, on the other. It also
helps makes sense of the private rights of action established in some regulatory
109. Cf Alon Harel, Public and Private Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL
LAW 1040, 1043 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hornle eds., 2015) ("The discourse concerning public and
private law requires first classifying a certain entity or a certain activity as 'private' or as 'public' and then
it requires drawing normative consequences from this classification.").
110. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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statutes.'11 We might expect the quality of public enforcement of a statute to turn
on the extent of diffuse externalities. But where policyrnakers perceive the
concentrated externalities to be high in proportion to the diffuse externalities, it
may be appropriate to supplement public enforcement with a private enforcement
regime. On this view, a private attorney general is not just a substitute for public
enforcement: her role is different and targets a separate class of private harms
even where the same conduct triggers public and private liability.
Most of the literature on externalities in private law concerns how tort and
property rules can be used to reduce externalities. And indeed it is especially
intuitive how those regimes operate to induce parties to internalize the social
costs of their activity. Property rights are the basis for liability and often that
liability turns on the value of the property. Including particular entitlements
within the basic sets of rights that come with real property, for example, has the
effect of exposing the property holder to liability in rough proportion to its value.
Tort law is conceived by many contemporary legal economists as little more than
a mechanism by which private individuals are induced to invest in precautions
against inefficient externalities.112
The anti-externality agenda makes an appearance in the contract literature,
too. There is a substantial concern with how the rules of contract can limit the
externalities imposed by one party on the other by virtue of imperfect
enforcement-i.e., the problem of opportunism.1 3 There is, however, little
attention given to the externalities produced by joint action through contract.
Although limiting third party externalities from contract is broadly recognized as
a legitimate regulatory function,114 it is regarded as among the reasons for
limiting contract altogether. That is, externalities from contract are taken to
dictate the boundaries of contract but not the content of contract law.", Most
statutory regulation of contract takes the form of mandatory terms that disallow
certain contracts. Even tortious interference with contract (a more limited tort
Ill. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
112. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 871-77 (1981); see also Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, I J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972) ("[T]he dominant function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability
that if followed will bring about, at least approximately, the fficient-the cost-justified-level of
accidents and safety.").
113. See George Cohen, Implied Terms and Interpretation in Contract Law, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS 78, 90 (B. Bouckaert & G.
de Geest eds., 2000) (explaining that "the problem of opportunistic behavior is perhaps the key
justification for court intervention in contracts" and defining opportunism as "deliberate contractual
conduct by one party contrary to the other party's reasonable expectations based on the parties' agreement,
contractual norms, or conventional morality").
114. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 346 (2007) ("There are two standard reasons for legal intervention in contracts: asymmetric
information and externalities.").
115. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 226-27 (5th ed.




than one might expect) does not prohibit the tortious interference per se, but
rather prices the externalities ex post in tort.' 16
We do not have a good reason for excluding contract law from the tools by
which we vindicate the basic duty of persons not to impose unjustified (that is,
legally cognizable) harms on others. Contracts against public policy are already
unenforceable, as, of course, are illegal contracts that contravene particular
statutes.l17 We should not limit our attention to the effects of bilateral agreement
on third parties to these exceptional cases. It is an established principle of
contract interpretation that agreements should be construed as reasonable."8 This
entails more than a speculative reconstruction of party intent. Courts already
prefer the substantively reasonable meaning of an ambiguous contract term to
one that appears to violate norms of fairness and reciprocity.1 19 Although courts
are appropriately focused on parties' objective intent, their inquiry into the most
reasonable construction of that intent is in part an inquiry into how we can
understand an agreement such that the agreement is reasonable, i.e., how we can
read it as compliant with background duties that parties in contract have toward
one another. In this way, the most reasonable interpretation of an agreement
already takes into account what people owe each other whether they intended to
comply with those duties or not.
Once the concept of reasonableness i released from exclusive reference to
actual party intent, the extension proposed here is a natural one: agreements
should be read in light of background duties owed third parties as well. This is
in many ways an easier case. While scholars might disagree about the authority
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1982).
118. Sutton v. East River Say. Bank, 55 N.Y.2d 550, 555 (1982) ("Our goal must be to
accord the words of the contract their 'fair and reasonable meaning."'); see also Harrah's Entertainment,
Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 313 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("In the event of ambiguity in a heavily
negotiated contract, it is generally the most reasonable meaning of the words used . . . to which courts
look in order to define contractual rights and duties."); Wrenfield Homeowners Ass'n v. DeYoung, 600
A.2d 960, 963 (Pa. 1991) ("The court will adopt an interpretation that is most reasonable and probable");
Ehlinger v. Hauser, 758 N.W.2d 476, 488 (Wis. 2008) (resolving a contract's ambiguity in favor of "the
most reasonable construction" of the term at issue).
119. See, e.g., Glenn Distrib. Corp. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc., 297 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir.
2002) ("Courts must be mindful to adopt an interpretation of ambiguous language which under all
circumstances ascribes the most reasonable, probable, and natural conduct of the parties, bearing in mind
the objects manifestly to be accomplished.") (internal citations omitted); Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193,
201 (1957) ("Even where the intention is doubtful or obscure, the most fair and reasonable construction,
imputing the least hardship on either of the contracting parties should be adopted. . so that neither will
have an unfair or unreasonable advantage over the other.."); Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wisconsin Gas
Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 787 (Wis. 2003) ("In ascertaining the meaning of a contract that is ambiguous, the
more reasonable meaning should be given effect on the probability that persons situated as the parties
were would be expected to contract in that way as opposed to a way which works an unreasonable
result.").The Restatement expressly a lows that "in choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise
or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1981). Unfortunately, the principle has not caught on
outside of limited contexts, such as those involving the provision of public services. See Eyal Zamir, The
Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1723-24
(1997) (describing situations where the rule has been applied). Zamir is among the few scholars to argue
that substantive reasonableness i  given inadequate weight in orthodox theories of interpretation.
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of individuals to shape their obligations toward other private individuals and the
appropriate effect of consent to a transaction, it is clear that parties to a
transaction have no authority to revise the entitlements of third parties and third
parties have in no way consented to the "alternative private arrangement" that a
contract represents. Thus, to the extent background legal interests of third parties
are implicated by an agreement, the state is only justified in enforcing that
agreement to the extent it adequately respects those legal interests.
The doctrine that agreements against public policy are void already
substantiates the essential principle that contract rights are bounded by the
interests of others. Courts look to statutes and well-established common law
principles to identify the kinds of agreements that impermissibly affect third
parties. As discussed in Part I, however, not every agreement that adversely
affects a legally protected third party interest can be actually prohibited. The
problem of how to deal with enforceable agreements remains. In the case of
ambiguous enforceable agreements, the question of interpretation presents itself
squarely. Yet the corollary to the general rule against contracts contrary to public
policy remains implicit and appears only sporadically: When an ambiguous
agreement would adversely affect the legal interests of third parties if interpreted
one way but not if interpreted another way, courts should prefer the interpretation
that generates fewer negative externalities. The interpretive principle is
analogous to the rule of statutory construction that courts will prefer an
interpretation that avoids the specter of unconstitutionality,1 2 0 or the similar rule
that statutes in abrogation of the common law will be narrowly construed.121
Where the terms of an agreement are ambiguous, a party's rights are to be
narrowly construed and obligations expansively construed in light of duties she
owes third parties. Similarly, when a party is on notice that her rights and
obligations under an ambiguous term adversely affect the legally protected
interests of a third party to whom her contracting partner owes a duty, that term
too should be construed in light of the background duty.
Such an interpretive rule is not a departure from doctrine or practice. Courts
already prefer the most reasonable interpretation f an ambiguous term, and in
at least some cases, allow that reasonableness has a substantive component.122
The effect of an agreement on others speaks to one aspect of reasonableness. I
do not propose that third party interests trump other established maxims of
120. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001) ("We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism
questions raised by respondents' interpretation."); Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress").
121. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502-03 (2012) (interpreting § 1983 in line
with ordinary tort principles); United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) ("Statutes which invade
the common law. . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.").





interpretation, each of which also guides a court in the still open-ended
reasonableness inquiry. Nor do third party interests become relevant only at the
point of hopeless ambiguity, that is, where all those other maxims fail to offer
direction. Third party interests are one element in the interpretive canon that
properly informs a choice among reasonable meanings of an ambiguous term.
One might worry about the flexibility inherent in such an interpretive
principle. And indeed, lawyers and theorists regularly worry about how courts
interpret a given ambiguous term, or ambiguous terms generally, because the
flexibility and open-ended character of the rule proposed here is already endemic
to contract interpretation as we know it. Notions of fairness are as unwieldy as
the legal concept of reasonableness through which fairness often rears its head
in adjudication; but we are unprepared to part with either notion. Comparatively,
the bearing of third party interests is at least constrained by legal norms
establishing the content of the legal interests at issue, that is, judges are not free
to name and protect any material interest to which they have sympathy.
Moreover, the premise of this method is that not all legally protected interests,
but only the most concentrated, warrant protection at the late stage of
interpretation.
We should also not take the present degree of uncertainty associated with
the rule to be inherent to it. The proposed principle will be more predictable in
application as precedent builds over time, just as other familiar doctrines like the
duty of good faith, mistake, unconscionability and promissory estoppel have all
been filled out over time. Each of those doctrines could be articulated in a way
that, in the abstract, threatens to engulf a good deal of surrounding doctrine. In
reality, each has been developed to fulfill its particular function without
compromising the integrity of contract law as a field. Repeated application of an
explicit rule will put parties on notice in contexts where it is regularly and
successfully invoked. It will also guide judges contemplating extensions to new
types of contracts.
The principle endorsed here applies only to ambiguous agreements. If some
worry that the doctrine is too open-ended, others might be concerned that it does
not go far enough. In particular, one might wonder why we should stop at
ambiguity: why not interpret all terms to be consistent with third party interests?
Instead of striking down terms facially inconsistent with public policy (and
protection of third party interests is a prime example of the kind of "public
policy" that bounds contract), we could reform such contract terms.
There are some contexts where courts reform terms to render them
compliant with public policy, but this does not occur under the guise of
interpretation. Overly broad noncompete provisions in employment contracts are
sometimes revised by courts to bring them within the bounds of public policy,
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rendering them enforceable.12 3 Similarly, overly broad waivers in standard form
contracts that appear to waive liability for intentional conduct are sometimes
reformed to waive only liability for negligence.12 4 But in neither context do
courts purport to be merely interpreting the agreements before them. The choice
to reform the terms is made as an alternative to striking them; it is at the stage of
determining the consequence of the agreement the parties made, not at the stage
of interpreting it.
Interpretation implies some good faith construction of the contract's
language.'2 5 Resolving ambiguity by reference to third party interests is not
inconsistent with the ordinary practice of interpreting text in that it does not
generate a meaning at odds with what a person might independently understand
the language in question to mean. Because third party interests are being brought
to bear only on ambiguous terms, they operate only as a means by which judges
choose among two or more reasonable interpretations.
This is not to suggest that courts are using third party interests only as their
basis for a best guess about party's real intentions. Courts already deploy default
rules to interpret ambiguous terms, or to supply terms in the face of contractual
gaps.126 Those default terms can be majoritarian but they are not always what we
think most parties in the situation would have preferred. Sometimes a default rule
is selected because it promotes the interests of future parties, as in penalty
defaults.12 7 Sticky default rules go further in making it affirmatively difficult for
parties to contract on terms disfavored by the court.128 Default rules and sticky
default rules, in particular, are the means by which courts interpret agreements
to avoid undermining third party interests.
123. See, e.g., H.B. 173, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (permitting courts to
revise restrictive covenant agreements in order to narrow the scope of restrictions instead of striking the
restriction altogether).
124. See Anita Cava & Don Wiesner, Rationalizing a Decade ofJudicial Responses to
Exculpatory Clauses, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 611, 612 (1988) (describing how many courts read
exculpatory clauses narrowly).
125. In fact, interpretation and construction are sometimes distinguished, with the
former but not the latter limited to deciphering communicative intent. See Lawrence Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT 95, 95-96 (2010); Peter Tiersma, The
Ambiguity of Interpretation: Distinguishing Interpretation from Construction, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1095
(1995). But contract doctrine delegates all considerations outside of text to a single stage, usually under
the heading of interpretation-sometimes the terms are used interchangeably. See, e.g., Osborne ex rel.
Osborne v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1160 n.21 (Del. 2010); United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc.,
937 A.2d 810, 830 (Del. Ch. 2007). And, of course, the essential thrust of the Article is that those
considerations appropriately include ones outside of communicative intent. Therefore, I will not engage
the interpretation/construction distinction here.
126. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gemer, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
127. Id. at 93-94.
128. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory ofAltering Rules, 121
YALE L. J. 2032, 2087 (2012) ("[S]ticky defaults are metaphorically a kind of way station on the road to
mandatory rules. They are quasi-mandatory rules that attempt to produce a constrained separating





By definition, parties can contract around default terms. Clear terms that
leave no room for a public-policy-minded inquiry into reasonableness hould
either be enforced or not. Using the exercise of contract interpretation to alter the
unambiguous meaning of terms merely disguises regulation of exchange and
risks, making it illegitimate for lack of transparency and costly for lack of
notice.129
One might argue that, even limited to ambiguous terms, incorporating the
interests of third parties into interpretation is at odds with the private law
structure of contract. Once we take into account the interests of others, one might
fear, private claims become a tool for vindicating public interest without regard
for the moral claims of litigants vis A vis one another.130 But the interpretative
defaults proposed here are not vulnerable to such a claim. They do not reflect an
undifferentiated public interest that asserts itself whenever a person encounters
the machinery of the state. These defaults reflect private obligations that
individuals have to other private people. The moral claims of those adversely
affected by private action are sometimes vindicated by public law and sometimes
protected by private law. Concentrated interests vulnerable to joint action by
others are not amoral interests; the corresponding duties that protect those
interests are moral duties of the sort that are the stuff of private law. They reflect
substantive moral constraints not only on the boundaries of free action (in tort)
but on the boundaries of free agreement.
The moral basis for reading agreements to avoid concentrated externalities
is evident in the moral asymmetry between third party winners and losers. Third
party beneficiaries may be vested with rights by a contract only where the parties
apparently intended to create such rights.13 1 This is fair where those third parties
had no baseline, legally cognizable interest at stake. A welfare-maximizing
approach to contract might plausibly lift the intentionality requirement even in
pursuit of positive externalities if the public benefits exceeded the long-term
distortion to private contracting. But that would be a morally arbitrary use of
contract that current doctrine correctly eschews.
Third party losers are differently situated because they already have legal
claims over one or both parties independent of the parties' intentions. Thus, their
interest in a protective reading of the contract should not similarly depend on any
expressed intention of the parties. Note that the claim here is not that the
agreement would create a new legal right of action in those third parties; they
would have to rely on existing legal bases for remedy. The claim is instead that
the interests of prospective third party losers appropriately inform the content of
an agreement as it controls the rights of contracting parties toward one another.
129. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE
L.J. 926, 928 n.3 (2010) (reviewing evidence that most contract disputes turn on interpretation).
130. See WEINRIB, supra note 53, at 156.
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §304 (1981) ("A promise in a
contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended
beneficiary may enforce the duty.").
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Where the harms to third parties from agreements are patterned, it may be
possible and appealing actually to ban certain contract terms. But sweeping
regulatory rules can be prohibitively costly, on account of both the publicly borne
costs of design and the privately bome costs of (inevitably) imperfect design.
The common law generally prefers flexible ex post rules in governing contract,
and the private law is generally better suited to regulating concentrated
externalities. It is logical that contract should be used to mitigate externalities
from agreements by way of flexible interpretative standards that make it more
costly to produce those externalities.
IV. Concentrated Externalities from Merger Agreements
Not everyone adversely affected by a private agreement between two other
people has a legally cognizable interest at stake. Courts should read ambiguous
terms in light of background duties only where those duties are already expressed
in public policy. Courts should be more vigilant about policing the effects of
private agreements on third parties through interpretation (as opposed to
legislative regulatory action) where those third party effects are concentrated.
We turn now to the case of merger agreements. At least four classes of third
parties may have legally recognized interests that are implicated by a merger
agreement: creditors, employees, shareholders and consumers. These groups are
of decreasing concentration, and for that reason I will explore their relevance in
that order. Creditors are usually the smallest and most fixed set of third parties
(though this may not be true if notes are broadly held). Employees are the next
group, identifiable and not very numerous in the ordinary case. Shareholders are
an intermediate group that is somewhat fluid. Consumers are a much larger set
of anonymous persons. The relevant interests of each group are also distinct in
their legal source. Creditors have contractual interests at stake. Workers have a
mixture of contract and other statutory interests. Shareholders have statutory
rights at stake but these rights are largely elaborated through Delaware case law.
Finally, consumers' interests are based in federal statute and are backed by an
elaborate regulatory infrastructure. On the view proposed here, all else being
equal, the more concentrated the adversely affected third party interest, the
stickier the protective interpretative default should be.
Before looking more closely at merger agreements, note that the essential
analytic point here is applicable across a wide range of contexts. For example,
we might extrapolate it to 'interpretation' of fiduciary duties owed by directors
and officers toward the corporation. The content of those duties, which might be
construed as the terms of their agreements with shareholders, is generally
dictated by the interests of shareholders. However, those duties can be and
sometimes are construed (that is, limited) to take into account third party
interests, like those of creditors or employees. These third party interests are most
plausibly part of the analysis when the shareholder interest is itself ambiguous,




corporation from a hostile takeover are permitted to take into account these
interests under Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., but once the shareholder interest
has more clearly boiled down to maximization of sale price, under Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the board is not permitted to take into
account those other interests.132 That is consistent with the general thrust of my
argument, which is that where terms of an agreement are ambiguous, courts
should interpret them in light of interests other than those of parties to the
agreement -even where the agreement is one as to corporate form.
Indeed, the principle developed here might help reconcile contractarian
views of the corporation with more instrumentalist ones.133 Contractarian
theories of the corporation regard it as an arrangement among shareholders
designed to solve their principal-agent problems, and the terms we would expect
shareholders to agree upon dictate the essence of corporate law.134 By contrast,
instrumentalist views of the corporation emphasize the legal form and social
function of corporations: Law allows their form in order to serve public policy
ends.'35 Although this divergence in perspective is a deep one, understanding
that the terms of contracts may not burden the legal interests of third parties
offers a theoretical basis for taking into account the interests of creditors,
employees and other stakeholders when interpreting the 'bargain' struck by
shareholders.
I turn now to the more literal agreements that corporations enter with each
other at the time of merger or acquisition. These agreements are peculiar in that
they often extinguish one of the parties to the agreement, substantially reducing
the litigation surrounding the terms of the merger once it has been executed. Most
litigation concerning mergers-and almost all mergers are subject to such
litigationl 3 6-alleges breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders. There are also,
however, classic contract disputes where a party to a merger agreement declines
132. Compare Unocal, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that a board defending
against a hostile takeover may consider the interests of constituencies other than shareholders), with
Revlon, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (determining that a board should not consider non-stockholder
interests when the object is not to protect the corporate enterprise but instead sell it to the highest bidder).
See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM. L. REv. 3277, 3316
(2013).
133. For a more detailed, albeit unsympathetic, overview of major approaches to
corporate law, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 444-49 (2001).
134. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICs 27-33
(2002); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 12 (1991).
135. See PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); David
Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1373, 1377-90 (1993).
136. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of
State Competition and Litigation 14 (Jan. 31, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1984758 (finding that "87.3% and 92.1% of all [studied merger] transactions
experience[d] litigation in 2010 and 2011").
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to move forward and where the seller survives as a distinct legal entity, as where
only assets or a subsidiary has been transferred. 3
A. Creditors
Creditors are affected by mergers. The legal status of their notes is often
affected by the transaction. Even when the resulting entity fully assumes liability
for the debt, its value is affected by the financial position of the new entity and
the status of creditors' debt relative to other debt.
Courts do not appear especially sympathetic to creditors' interests in
mergers. For example, in Global Asset Capital, LLC v. Rubicon US REIT,'3 8 a
buyer sought to enforce a letter of intent agreement against a company that was,
at the time, on the verge of insolvency. After the letter of intent had been
executed, Rubicon reconsidered and sought to avoid the bankruptcy process
contemplated by the letter of agreement. The letter of agreement contained no
fiduciary out.139 Nevertheless, Rubicon claimed that it retained the right to walk
away because of directors' duties to its creditors, who might recover more in an
alternative process that did not confer any advantage on Global Asset Capital.
The Delaware court acknowledged that creditors' interests might be part of
the conglomeration of corporate interests that directors were supposed to defend,
but it rejected any duty to creditors. It held that it had already rejected such a
duty in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v.
Gheewalla.140 More generally, the court rejected any implied fiduciary out.
My analysis does not directly argue in favor of any particular resolution on
the facts of Global Asset Capital. But it does favor a rule of interpretation with
respect to the preliminary question in that case: was there a binding agreement
(the court held yes), and was bankruptcy a condition to all provisions in the
agreement, including a duty to bargain in good faith, or only certain terms (the
court held the former)? To the extent the text of the agreement was ambiguous
on these questions, my analysis recommends taking into account the interests of
creditors even in the absence of any default fiduciary out. By contrast, the
Delaware court emphasized the non-fiduciary character of Rubicon's obligations
to its creditors and the requirement of an express provision creating a fiduciary
out only in its analysis of whether the agreement was enforceable against
137. John Coates describes merging parties' practices in anticipation of contract
disputes arising from merger agreements. See John Coates, Managing Disputes through Contract:
Evidence From M&A, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 295 (2012). The frequency and complexity of these
mechanisms suggests that firms take seriously the prospect of disputes concerning the terms in merger
agreements.
138. C.A. No. 5071-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2009).
139. Fiduciary outs allow the board of a target company to entertain unsolicited offers
where necessary to comply with directors' fiduciary duties. See Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During
Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops-The Development, Effectiveness, and Implications of
Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 525, 534 (2008).




Rubicon, not on the question of how the ambiguous terms of that agreement
should be read.
Creditors' interests in a merger were also at issue in Wavedivision Holdings,
LLC v. Millennium Digital Media Systems.141 There the Delaware Chancery
court held Millennium in breach of several terms of an asset purchase agreement,
including a no-solicitation clause and reasonable best efforts clause. The
reasonable best efforts clause required Millennium to obtain approval for the
transaction from secured creditors and a group of note holders who could not
expect payment from the deal. Creditors were well-represented in the
management of Millennium and Millennium ultimately concluded a refinancing/
asset transfer with the note holders, terminating the agreement with
Wavedivision on the grounds that it failed to obtain consent from creditors.
The court was highly unsympathetic to Millennium's recounting of events
and its apparently willful breach of its agreement with Wavedivision.
Millennium actively and secretly sought an alternative arrangement with
creditors throughout the time it represented to Wavedivision that it was
attempting to secure creditor approval.
An interesting question raised by this case is whether the intimate role of
creditors throughout he decision-making process of Millennium is among the
reasons why Millennium could not invoke their interests to justify pursuit of
alternatives to the agreement with Wavedivision. We might think not because
the court observed in Wavedivision that the initial impulse to pursue a sale
agreement with Wavedivision came from Millennium's perceived obligation to
senior creditors and because fiduciary outs will generally not be implied. A few
small variations in the fact pattern, however, could cast creditors' interests in the
sales agreement in a different light. For example, imagine a company in arms-
length relations with its creditors prompted by an impending payment deadline
to pursue an asset sale, which would require the approval of creditors. Imagine
the company is instead offered a refinancing, debt-for-equity arrangement by
those creditors. It seems plausible that the scope of its obligations under a non-
solicitation clause should be interpreted differently with respect to those creditors
than other potential buyers. This is because the agreement with the buyer
implicates the interests of creditors' existing contract rights. This argument
would be all the more compelling were the creditors not entitled-as was
arguably the case with respect to Millennium's note holders-to block the asset
purchase by the outside buyer.
Indeed, the one case in which a court seemed sympathetic to creditors was
one where the creditors were shut out of the decision-making process related to
the merger. (It is really only on such facts that my analysis applies, since to the
extent creditors exercise control over the terms of a merger, they are not truly
third parties to it.) In Dawson v. Pittco Capital Partners,14 2 a Delaware Chancery
141. 2010 WL 3706624 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2010).
142. 2012 WL 1564805 (Del Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
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court held that notes held by investors in a now-merged entity had not been
validly cancelled. It applied the rule that though "parties to contract are free to
provide that contractual rights and obligations will not survive a merger, they
must do so in clear and unambiguous terms."l4 3 The effect of the ruling is to
make it more difficult for merging parties to derogate the rights of creditors even
when those creditors are also equity holders in a merging entity. The rule thus
limits one strategy by which equity holders in merging corporations might
privilege their interests over those of creditors, especially where those creditors
are unable to block amendments to LLC agreements initiated by controlling
equity holders (even if the controlling equity holders do not amount to a single
controlling block subject to fiduciary duties).
Contract creditors may not be the most sympathetic constituency because
they are able to price the risk of nonpayment into their initial debt agreements.
Nonadjusting creditors would certainly have a better claim to protection. But to
the extent we doubt the ability of creditors to price their debt appropriately in
response to certain long-term and low-probability events, and to the extent their
ordinary recourse in contract is thwarted by the possibility of write-off in
bankruptcy, we might sometimes give their interests some weight in the
interpretation of ambiguous agreements entered by merging entities.
B. Employees
Employees are affected by mergers in various ways. They have vested
interests that are more or less likely to be honored; they have noncontract
interests in ongoing employment that are more or less likely to be protected; they
are sometimes organized into collective bargaining units that lose their
presumptive status of recognition upon merger by the employer.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act,144 Multiemployer Pension
Plan Amendments Act of 1980145 and Workers Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act 46 all address in substantial part externalities created by mergers
and acquisitions between two corporations for their employees. Some provisions
of merger agreements incidentally affect employees; others are inserted for the
purpose of complying with separate duties. Interestingly, target companies often
negotiate for employee protection beyond that which is required by statute. For
example, it is commonplace to have a provision that reads something like:
"[Buyer] agrees to maintain benefits for all employees who at date of merger
were covered by Welfare Plan of [Target] comparable to those provided to those
employees of [Buyer] already employed at date of merger" or "[Buyer] agrees to
143. Id. at *18.
144. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,
18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
145. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 and 29 U.S.C.).




maintain benefits for all retired employees of [Target] comparable to, and in no
event less than, the benefits provided by [Target] to those retired employees at
date of merger."l47 These same agreements expressly disavow the creation of any
third party beneficiaries.
Employees do not, however, have to rely on third party beneficiary status
under ERISA. ERISA effectively allows them to pursue a private claim against
the new entity in order to avoid certain adverse ffects of a merger, regardless of
whether merging parties intended employees to have such an enforcement right.
Terms in merger agreements that provide for continuity in employee benefits are
treated as amendments to a qualified ERISA plan (there is a contrary minority
view that views such as amendments as barred by doctrine of estoppels).
Beneficiaries of those plans thus have standing to sue on the basis of the merger
agreement, even where those agreements expressly disavow any third party
beneficiaries.
ERISA protection is limited to vested rights, and so it is limited to
employee's contract interests. The court in Berman v. International Controls
Corp.,148 held that a term that required the new corporate entity to provide
employees "comparable benefits" was unambiguous and that the employer was
acting qua employer not as plan fiduciary in amending the plan by way of that
merger term. The court held that a health plan instituted by the new employer
had enough features in common with the previous plan to qualify as
"comparable."1 49 The court's ruling was out of line with other jurisdictions in its
refusal to subject the merger clause to ERISA on the theory that it was adopted
qua employer rather than as fiduciary.
Although other jurisdictions might disagree that the clause did not implicate
duties governed by ERISA, the Berman court was not anomalous in holding that
employees' interests were protected only insofar as they were vested interests
governed by ERISA. My account of the role of contract interpretation in
mitigating externalities helps show hy broader protection may be justified. A
contract with a term like "comparable," which seems clearly ambiguous, would
be interpreted by reference to employees' interests even if these interests fall
outside the technical ambit of ERISA. ERISA together with other statutes
recognizes a legal interest that employees have in their employers' ongoing
commitment to them, contractual or otherwise. Although courts should not add
obligations for the benefit of employees to contracts between merging parties,
147. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. Benefits Comm. v. Graves, 463 F.3d 360, 365 ( 5th Cir.
2006) (finding Halliburton failed to maintain benefits pursuant to terms in merger agreement with Dressler
Industries, Inc.).
148. No. 88-6206-CIV-PAINE, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16001, at *18 (S.D. Fla. June
28, 1990).
149. See also Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1471 (1 Ith Cir. 1986) (holding
that fiduciary provisions of ERISA are not implicated with respect to contingent and non-vested future
benefits and that the "ERISA scheme envisions that employers will act in a dual capacity as both fiduciary
to the plan and as employer.").
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where the merging parties themselves have agreed on some protective language,
all else being equal, ambiguities should be resolved to protect employee interests.
The ERISA scheme is an interesting mechanism by which a statute sets up
a way for private parties to vindicate interests implicated in others' agreements.
Because in the merger context one of the parties to the agreement is usually
extinguished, there do not seem to be many cases where the meaning of an
employee benefits clause is litigated as between the parties. But where that arises,
as in the context of an asset sale that transfers liability for some employee
benefits, out of which both entities emerge intact, it seems certain that a court
would interpret the contract language in line with ERISA obligations even
though the plaintiff is not an employee.
C. Shareholders
Of all the third parties affected by mergers, shareholders are the most
protected. That may be because they own one of the contracting parties, thus
recasting the problem of externalities into one of imperfect agency. But from a
legal perspective, the corporation is a continuous legal person distinct from its
fluid set of owners. Thus, the costs that it imposes on its owners may be regarded
as a negative externality. Shareholders are also a concentrated group that are, at
least at any moment, of fixed and finite number. Moreover, more so than
creditors, their interests are protected by nebulous fiduciary duties that suffer
from precisely the problems of under-specification that trigger separate (second-
best) management of externalities.
The basis for most references to shareholders' interests in the context of
merger agreement interpretation is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc. 50 That line of cases subjects deal protection measures like lock-
up options and no-shop provisions to scrutiny. Such devices may represent
breaches of fiduciary duty by directors that adopt them. The implication of my
view is that courts should interpret lock-up options and o-shop provisions in the
course of disputes between parties to the merger agreement with an eye to the
fiduciary duties that constrained one of the parties. Courts do just that.
In Vector Capital Corp. v. Ness Technology, Inc.,'51 an exclusivity
agreement was ambiguous as to whether it prohibited only communications with
prospective buyers or whether it also disallowed internal communications about
prospective bids. Target Ness had agreed not to "enter [into] discussions" about
alternative transactions.'52 The court interpreted the term narrowly because to
include a ban on even internal communications would make it impossible for the
board to comply with its fiduciary duties.'53 The court applied reasoning
150. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).






analogous to that proposed here, not to resolve an ambiguity but to hold that a
term in an exclusivity agreement was unambiguous. The court concluded that the
term necessarily applied only to external discussions because
[I]nterpreting the Agreement to prohibit Ness's officers from discussing
unsolicited proposals would produce an unreasonable result: Ness would be
obligated by contract to violate governing law ... Contractual provisions that limit
full exercise of fiduciary duties are 'invalid and unenforceable' because 'directors
[cannot] contract away their fiduciary obligations.' . . . [Ilt would be
'commercially unreasonable [and] contrary to the reasonable expectations of the
parties' to interpret the contract to require a party to violate its existing business
duties. Here, if Ness had agreed not to discuss unsolicited proposals internally, it
would have been unable to fulfill its duty under Delaware law of securing the
highest sale value for its shareholders . . . Ness would not have knowingly put
itself in this position.1 54
Courts could extend this logic to other potentially ambiguous terms in
merger agreements. Consider the status of standstill agreements under current
law. Delaware courts appear to be skeptical of them but have not deemed them
per se invalid. They enjoined "don't ask, don't waive" provisions without
declaring them against public policy (on grounds that they interfere with
directors' ability to fulfill fiduciary duties). It seems likely that courts will not
enforce these provisions where the target entertains multiple offers from bidders
not subject to a standstill agreement; the effect of the agreement in such cases is
merely to block particular bidders from offering higher bids. Using the approach
recommended here, courts could interpret these standstill agreements as
incorporating a condition that waivers will only be declined where all bids in
contention come from buyers subject o similar limitations. Implying such a
condition would go some way toward limiting their negative effects under certain
conditions while preserving them as a tool for auctioning of a target under
appropriate circumstances.55
The rule might also be applied in the context of side agreements that
acquiring firms sometimes enter with executives tendering stocks pursuant to a
tender offer, as was the case in Padilla v. MedPartners, Inc.,156 or with a parent
corporation of a target subsidiary, as was the case in Millionerrors Investment
Club v. GE, P.L.C.157 Those agreements are at risk of violating Section 14(d) of
154. Id.
155. The situation described or one similar arose in In re Ancestry.com, Inc.
Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012); In re Complete Genomics, Inc.
Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012); In re Celera Corp. Stockholders Litig.,
C.A. No. 6304-VCP (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012); In re RehabCare Grp., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No.
6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011); and In re Topps Co. Stockholders Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007)
. See also Christina Sautter, Promises Made to Be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control
Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929 (2013).
156. No. CV98-1092-RSWL, 1998 WL 34073629 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 1998).
157. No. Civ.A.99-781, 2000 WL 1288333, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000).
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which implements the all-holder best price
rule.1ss Those agreements should be construed to avoid requiring consideration
in excess of the tender offer price and as "conditioned" on the tender offer's
success so as to bring them within the ambit of the Section 14(d) rule.
No-shop provisions and prompt notice requirements are almost always
ambiguous in the particular actions they prohibit or permit. For example, in
NA CCO Industries, Inc. v. Applica Inc.,'59 the court considered pre-contractual
contact between the target and another buyer as relevant to the nature of post-
contractual contact because the terms were unclear in themselves as to when
responsiveness or enthusiastic cooperation amounted to encouragement of an
alternative bid. It was also unclear in NACCO how much notice is required under
a prompt notice clause. To the extent contact with alternative bidders and some
degree of secrecy may be essential to obtaining highest value for shareholders,
courts may narrowly construe these clauses to avoid requiring breach of fiduciary
duty.
Finally, merger agreements often contain ambiguous warranty clauses and
ambiguous material adverse effect clauses.160 One might interpret these in light
of shareholder duties by assuming some alignment between the knowledge
imputed to shareholders in securities litigation and the knowledge imputed to
buyers under these clauses.
None of this is to say that corporations should be granted default fiduciary
outs. That position has been expressly rejected by courts thus far.16' But the
current practice of enforcing a fiduciary out for which a target has contracted,
like the more general principle that contracts against public policy are
unenforceable, is only the start of more fully accounting for the interests of
shareholders in the interpretation of merger agreements.
D. Consumers
Consumers are the final group considered here. Should their interest also be
taken into account in the interpretation of merger agreements? Probably not. Of
the various third parties considered here, consumers are the most diffuse. And
indeed, there is a robust administrative infrastructure in place for protecting their
interests. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 requires
merging parties to file a detailed notice to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
if the proposed transaction exceeds certain size thresholds.'62 The FTC review is
158. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a) (2006).
159. 997 A.2d I (Del. Ch. 2009).
160. See, e.g., In re IBP, Inc., S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 56-63, 65-71 (Del. Ch.
2001).
161. See In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch.
Nov. 9, 2012) ("[D]irectors of the selling corporation are not free to terminate an otherwise binding merger
agreement just because they are fiduciaries and circumstances have changed.").




intended to prevent mergers that will adversely affect consumers. Although
critics are sometimes unhappy with the standards applied in FTC review,
overlapping jurisdiction among states (internationally as well as within the U.S.
federal structure) has mitigated political discontent with any one approach. The
basic infrastructure is in place to protect consumers from anticompetitive
conduct. Their diffuse stake in mergers is best treated in public law and does not
require the support of a private law tool like contract interpretation.
Conclusion
I have made two claims in this Article: first, private law attends to
concentrated externalities while public law regulates diffuse externalities.
Second, contract law, in keeping with its position within private law, should limit
not just the harms imposed by contracting parties on each other but also the
harms jointly imposed by contracting parties on third party losers.
The first claim buttresses the second because it assigns to contract a role in
the larger institutional scheme by which law protects us from the harms we
impose on each other. That role consists of regulating the harms that accompany
agreements for exchange. Many of those harms are borne by contracting parties
themselves, such as the harms that follow from misrepresentation, coercive
conduct, breach, or opportunistic renegotiation. Contract law has long evolved
with the aim of limiting those bilateral harms. It is less sensitive to the harms that
contracting parties together impose on others. In some cases, injurious terms are
banned or give rise to independent rights of actions in others. But not all legal
interests are so robustly protected and contract law can help fill a gap in our
second-best state of the world.
The two claims of the Article are intuitive. Each has gone unremarked
because it falls outside the headlights of dominant theoretical frameworks. The
first claim, a proposed division of labor between public and private law, takes
the distinction seriously without exaggerating it. In doing so it departs from
philosophers, economists, and critical scholars. Legal philosophers tend to see
private law as vindicating bilateral moral obligations without any regulatory
purpose; the latter is characteristic only of public law. Economists neglect
concentrated externalities because they are relatively amenable to private
resolution; they underemphasize the reality of bargaining failure and its
distributive consequences. The r sult is an exaggerated faith in private ordering.
Other scholars, reacting to the historical biases associated with the distinction,
are now loathe to recognize the "reified" categories of public and private at all.
The aim of this Article in part has been to give content to the distinction in a way
that is useful for matching subject and regulatory method.
My second but primary claim has been about a rule of contract
interpretation. I have argued that contract should be enlisted to protect third party
losers from the special class of actions that is contract law's core subject.
Coordinated action receives all matter of deference on the theory that individuals
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are free to control their destiny - or at least, maximize their own welfare as they
conceive it. But agreements of exchange often impose costs on third parties.
Those costs impinge on a range of legally protected interests. In particular classes
of contract, as in merger agreements, these third party effects are obvious and
indeed they are accounted for in both regulation and common law principles.
Through a process of reflective equilibrium,6 3 we need to revise our
understanding of what contract interpretation entails to account for these
observed practices. Third party losers would be more explicitly protected if we
relaxed our misplaced commitment o interpreting agreements only with
reference to the intentions of contracting parties. That narrow bind is least
justified where agreements adversely affect the legal interests of third parties.
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